How to Get the Snowball Rolling and Extend the Franchise: Voting on the Great Reform Act of 1832 by Aidt, Toke S. & Franck, R.
 1
How to Get the Snowball Rolling and Extend the Franchise:  
Voting on the Great Reform Act of 1832* 
Toke S. Aidta 
Faculty of Economics and Jesus College, University of Cambridge 
Raphaël Franckb 
Department of Economics, Bar Ilan University 
Abstract 
This paper suggests a new approach to analyze the causes of franchise extension. 
Based on a new dataset, it provides a detailed econometric study of the Great Reform Act 
of 1832 in the United Kingdom. The econometric analysis yields four main results. First, 
modernization theory only receives mixed support. Second, the reform enjoyed some 
measure of popular support. Third, the threat of revolution had an asymmetric impact on 
the voting behavior of the pro-reform Whigs and the anti-reform Tories. While the threat 
might have convinced reluctant reformers among the Whig politicians – and among their 
patrons – to support the bill, it seems to have hardened the resistance to reform among the 
Tories. Fourth, ideology played a critical role. However, it also appears that self-interest 
and political expedience explained the votes of many Members of Parliament. 
 
Keywords: Franchise extension; democratization; The Great Reform Act. 
JEL Classification: D7, H1. 
 
                                                 
* We thank Hans Pitlik and participants at the 2008 EPCS meeting in Jena for helpful comments. The usual 
disclaimer applies.  
a Faculty of Economics, Austin Robinson Building, Sidgwick Avenue, CB39DD Cambridge, U.K. Email: 
tsa23@econ.cam.ac.uk. 
b Bar Ilan University, Department of Economics, 52900 Ramat Gan, Israel. Email: franckr@mail.biu.ac.il. 
 2
1. Introduction 
To this day, the passing in 1832 by the British Parliament of a bill, which 
subsequently became known as the Great Reform Act, is seen as a watershed. The 
immediate consequences of this reform were to redistribute parliamentary seats from the 
small “rotten boroughs”1 to the large and fast growing industrial cities, as well as to 
extend the franchise to “respectable” segments of the middle class. But in the long run, 
the Great Reform Act was the pivotal event that got the snowball rolling: it was the first 
of five major reforms that gradually transformed the political system in the United 
Kingdom. In the 1830 general election, no more than three per cent of the adult male 
population could cast their vote while the bulk of the 658 Members of Parliament (MPs) 
were returned in uncontested elections. Less than 100 years later, in 1928, all men and 
women aged 21 and above could vote in contested elections. In the intertwining years, the 
franchise had gradually been extended by the Second Reform Act of 1867, the Third 
Reform Act of 1884, and the Fourth Reform Act of 1918. In addition, the secret ballot 
had been introduced in 1872, plural votes discontinued, and a uniform system of 
districting adopted (see among others Machin, 2001). 
Broadly speaking, the historical narrative suggests two rationales for the success of 
the Great Reform Act.2 One emphasizes extra-parliamentarian pressures and points to 
evidence such as the riots in several towns in the autumn of 1831, talks of armed 
uprising, and the flood of petitions to Parliament from all parts of the country in support 
of reform. Another emphasizes changes in the balance of power within Parliament. These 
                                                 
1 Rotten boroughs were also known as “nomination” or “pocket” boroughs.  
2 See Brock (1973) and Cannon (1973) among others. See also Evans (2000) for a concise exposition. 
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changes included the fall of the anti-reform Tory government in 1830 which allowed a 
pro-reform Whig government to take office for the first time since 1806. 
 But beyond the historical narrative, economists and political scientists alike have 
developed formal theories that seek to explain the willingness of ruling elites to share 
power with groups whose goals they may oppose. They have emphasized modernization 
theory, i.e., the role of economic growth and social progress (Moore, 1966), the role of 
ideology (Tilly, 2004), mass conscription armies (Janowitz, 1976), or the broader context 
of constitutional bargaining (Congleton, 2004, 2007). Some prominent scholars, e.g., 
Justman and Gradstein (1999), Acemoglu and Robinson (2000; 2005) and Boix (2003), 
have argued that external pressures, which are often conceptualized as a threat of 
revolution, forced the elites to share power. Seen in this perspective, granting voting 
rights to previously disenfranchised groups was a lesser evil for the ruling elite. Others 
have suggested that the extension of the suffrage was a consequence of economic 
changes that made democracy more profitable for the ruling elite. This might be the case 
if property rights are better protected under democracy (Gradstein, 2007), if democracy 
enhances human capital accumulation (Bourguignon and Verdier, 2000) or if a significant 
fraction of the elite can benefit from greater provision of public services under 
democratic governments (Lizzeri and Persico, 2004).  
All of these theories offer convincing interpretations of specific historical episodes 
and can be supported by detailed historical case studies. Some of them have also been 
subjected to econometric testing.3 These tests, which focus on the consequences of 
                                                 
3 See among others Meltzer and Richard (1983), Hettich and Winer (1988), Lindert (1994), Husted and 
Kenny (1997), Kenny and Lott (1999), Persson and Tabellini (2003), Aidt et al. (2006) and Aidt and Jensen 
(2008a, 2008b). 
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suffrage reform rather than on its underlying causes, employ cross-country or cross-state 
variations in the franchise rules to identify the effects of democratization. 
This paper suggests a new approach to the study of franchise extension. Our 
approach is to investigate the underlying causes of democratization by studying the votes 
of the politicians who adopt suffrage reforms. This allows us to test the relevance of 
competing theories of democratization in new ways.4 The Great Reform Act of 1832 is 
well-suited for such an empirical approach because it was debated and voted on under the 
rules of the Unreformed Parliament. These rules had not been changed for almost 200 
years prior to the reform and can therefore be taken as exogenous.5 Moreover, the 
Unreformed Parliament exhibited a very rich and varied set of institutions that allows us 
to construct new tests of four prominent theories of franchise extension. We can thus 
assess the causal role played by ideology, the threat of a revolution, and economic factors 
such as the rise of a middle class and economic prosperity, in the adoption of the Great 
Reform Act. For this purpose, we assembled a new dataset from a combination of 
primary and secondary sources that provides detailed information on the characteristics 
of each parliamentary constituency in England and Wales, as well as on the elected MPs.6  
The econometric analysis yields four main results. First, modernization theory only 
receives mixed support. On the one hand, we find that economic prosperity in a 
                                                 
4 Schonhardt-Bailey (1998) adopts a similar approach in her study of industrial and agricultural interests in 
the German Parliament during the nineteenth-century. See also Schonhardt-Bailey (2006) on the repeal of 
the Corn Laws. 
5 The challenge of finding exogenous variations in institutions has received substantial attention in some 
recent studies on democratization. On this issue, see, for instance, Acemoglu et al. (2001). 
6 As a caveat, it must be noted that the lack of information about the characteristics of the Scottish and Irish 
boroughs and counties compels us to focus on the MPs elected in England and Wales only. Out of the 658 
MPs returned to Parliament in 1830 and 1831, 513 were elected in England and Wales. 
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constituency increased, rather than decreased, the likelihood that an anti-reform MP was 
returned to Parliament. On the other hand, we do find some evidence that the economic 
changes that created more cohesive working and middle classes spurred the reform 
process. Second, the reform enjoyed some measure of popular support. In particular, we 
find that pro-reform MPs were more likely to be elected in constituencies with relatively 
large electorates and contested elections. Third, the threat of revolution had an 
asymmetric impact on the voting behavior of the pro-reform Whigs and the anti-reform 
Tories. While the threat might have convinced reluctant reformers among the Whig MPs 
– and among their patrons – to support the bill, it seems to have hardened the resistance 
to reform among the Tories. Fourth, ideology played a critical role. However, we also 
find evidence that self-interest and political expedience explained the votes of many MPs. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the political 
system in the United Kingdom under the Unreformed Parliament and provides an 
overview of the events that led to the Great Reform Act. Section 3 sets out our 
hypotheses and econometric strategy. Section 4 discusses the empirical results. Section 5 
concludes. The Appendix provides some additional estimations and outlines the content 
of the Great Reform Act. 
2. The Unreformed Parliament and the Great Reform Act: Data and 
Historical Background 
In 1830, the electoral rules of the Unreformed Parliament were still virtually the 
same as in the past centuries. Despite the economic transformations caused by the 
industrial revolution, there had neither been any substantial redistribution of seats since 
the seventeenth century, nor any notable extension of the franchise. This had already 
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created by the end of the eighteenth century a large imbalance between the old and new 
population centers. The South of England, particularly Cornwall, was over-represented, 
while the large industrial cities in the Midlands and the North, such as Birmingham, 
Leeds and Manchester, did not elect any MP.  
The politics of the Unreformed Parliament was very different from that of modern 
parliamentary democracies. Firstly, the franchise rules, which governed who could vote, 
were not uniform throughout the country. Some franchises allowed for large electorates 
while others did not, and the vast majority of the adult population was disenfranchised. 
Voting was not secret, and polling lasted several days. Secondly, patronage was a major 
feature of the Unreformed Parliament: aristocrats or commoners, called patrons, 
controlled the electorate, either fully or partially, in many boroughs and counties. As a 
result, most elections were not contested on a regular basis (Cannon, 1973, Appendix 3). 
Thirdly, by modern standards, elections were highly corrupt. Candidates willing to spend 
money could always buy a seat, and not only in the rotten boroughs, which could be 
bought right out, such as Gatton which was sold for £180,000 in the summer of 1830. 
Indeed, elections were costly because voters expected candidates to organize banquets at 
the time of the polls and to compensate them for travel expenses. This practice, called 
“treating”, cost more than £100,000 to the candidates running in Liverpool in 1830. It 
was not unusual that candidates spend at least £20,000 to finance their campaigns to win 
an open seat in a borough.7  
In the remainder of this section, we describe how the Unreformed Parliament 
worked and present the data that we employ in the econometric analysis. We also provide 
                                                 
7 This should be compared to the annual income of the 200 richest families. It was about £50,000 per 
annum. The income of the gentry was less than £2,000 per annum. 
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a brief historical overview of the events that culminated in the adoption of the Great 
Reform Act. Table A1 in the Appendix presents descriptive statistics.  
2.1. Politicians and political parties in the Unreformed Parliament 
The 658 seats of the Unreformed Parliament were divided between 188 county 
seats, 465 borough seats and five university seats.8 England and Wales respectively 
returned 489 and 24 MPs while Scotland and Ireland elected the remainder. Due to data 
limitations, our econometric analysis is restricted to the MPs elected in England and 
Wales. Therefore, most of the descriptive evidence we present below only relates to this 
group of MPs.  
The MPs received no salary and were subject to a high property qualification. 
This effectively prevented individuals from the lower classes from running in the 
elections. Between 1780 and 1830, about one-fifth of all MPs were the sons of peers, 
while 200 MPs could be said to represent the gentry (Whitfield, 2001, p. 33). The data 
that we collected on the occupations and the social background of the MPs elected in 
1830 and in 1831 illustrate the aristocratic nature of the Unreformed Parliament very 
clearly.9 The MPs were army officers, lawyers or jurists, bankers, industry owners, 
merchants, landowners or “dynasty heirs”, i.e., the MPs who were immediately returned 
to Parliament when they finished their education and/or reached majority.10 Many MPs 
                                                 
8 The universities of Cambridge, Dublin and Oxford were self-governing bodies that returned MPs on a 
franchise that granted all graduates the right to vote. Cambridge and Oxford returned two MPs while the 
University of Dublin returned only one MP. 
9 The data are collected from Judd (1955), Namier and Brooke (1964), Porrit and Porrit (1903), Stookes 
Smith (1973), Thorne (1986), and various editions of Dod’s Parliamentary Companions. 
10 It must be noted that the categories are not mutually exclusive and many MPs are therefore recorded in 
more than one category, e.g., army officer and landowner. In our estimations, we use landowners as the 
control group.  
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also had a relative who previously sat in Parliament. The distribution of the MPs’ 
occupations in the 1830 and 1831 Parliaments, respectively, is shown in Figure 1. We 
notice a small drop in the representation of landowners and in “dynasty heirs” between 
the 1830 and 1831 Parliaments, but it is clear that both Parliaments were dominated by 
the landowning interest. 
[Figure 1 here] 
Although political parties in the modern sense did not exist in the Unreformed 
Parliament, it is possible to identify two broad groupings of MPs: the Tories and the 
Whigs. The Tories defended the prerogatives of the monarch and the status of the Church 
of England. They supported the governments appointed by the British kings from 1808 to 
1830 and were hostile to parliamentary reform. They feared the dangerous precedent that 
even a modest reform would set, but their opposition was also motivated by self-interest 
since many Tories were returned in rotten boroughs.  
 The Whigs were in favor of shifting the balance of power from the King to the 
Commons. They were also supportive of the demand of nonconformists and Catholics for 
greater religious freedom and civil equality. The Whigs were more inclined to 
parliamentary reform than the Tories. Both parties, however, held the strong belief that 
society was best governed by the landowning classes, and that the other classes should be 
kept away from power. Many Whigs, including Lord Grey – the Prime Minister who 
eventually oversaw the reform of Parliament – were reluctant reformers (Cannon, 1973, 
chapter 8).11 Neither the Whigs nor the Tories supported universal male suffrage. Such 
                                                 
11 An exception was Lord John Russell, who was a keen supporter of reform and was behind several reform 
attempts in the early 1820s, including the disenfranchisement of Grampound. 
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far-reaching ideas were reserved for the third “party”, the Radicals, who were only 
represented in the 1830 Parliament by six MPs.12  
 The 1830 Parliament was dominated by the Tories who held 63 per cent of the 
English and Welsh seats. After the 1831 election, which was fought almost exclusively 
on the reform question, the majority had shifted with 55 per cent of the seats now being 
held by the Whigs. 
2.2. The economic, administrative and political characteristics of the English and Welsh 
constituencies 
The constituencies where the MPs of the Unreformed Parliament were elected did 
not only differ by their economic circumstances, but also by their governance structure 
and franchise rules. Differences in institutional arrangements and economic 
circumstances affected the ease with which patrons could exercise influence.  
2.2.1. The economic circumstances of the constituencies 
We use two sources of information to assess the economic circumstances of the 
constituencies. Firstly, the 1831 Census of Great Britain provides information that can be 
used to reckon the occupational structure of each constituency in England and Wales. 
These data include the shares of agricultural and industrial workers, landowners, artisans, 
servants, professionals, e.g., lawyers and doctors, in the workforce of each constituency.13 
                                                 
12 Some Radicals even opposed the unsuccessful attempt by Lord Russell to give representation to some 
large British towns in February 1830 because they considered that the measures were not extensive enough. 
13 The census and parliamentary districts do not overlap exactly. This should be kept in mind when 
studying the descriptive statistics but does not limit the relevance of these data for our estimations. The 
reason is that we use these data to assess the impact of economic circumstances in the elections, not to infer 
how individuals voters voted (see King, 1997). In any case, as we discuss below, most individuals did not 
have the right to vote under the rules of the Unreformed Parliament.  
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As one would expect, the vast majority of the adult population were employed as 
unskilled workers or servants. Only a small fraction belonged to the landowning class 
while professionals made up about 14 per cent of the workforce. 
Secondly, we use the information provided by Philbin (1965) to single out the 
constituencies that were thriving and those that underwent a marked economic decline at 
the time of the Great Reform Act.14 Measured in this way, 91 constituencies had a 
thriving economy in 1830 while 102 were undergoing a notable decline. 
2.2.2. The franchise rules and the governance structure of the constituencies 
As mentioned above, the franchise rules of the Unreformed Parliament were 
complex and not uniform. In the English and Welsh counties, the franchise rules allowed 
men to vote if they owned freehold land or property worth at least 40 shillings a year. The 
40-shilling qualification had not been indexed since its introduction in 1430. Thus, by 
1830, it had become a very modest qualification which allowed many relatively poor 
tenant farmers to vote. However, they did not have the financial resources to stand up to 
their landlords, who would often tell them how to vote.15  
Unlike the counties which had a uniform franchise, there were six franchise types 
in the English and Welsh boroughs, as documented in Table 1. The Table shows the 
                                                 
14 For most constituencies, no information is recorded. We assume that these constituencies followed the 
general (downward) economic trend and they make up our control group in the statistical analysis. 
15 The franchise rules in Ireland and Scotland were different from those in England and Wales. The rules 
governing the election of the 100 Irish MPs were designed to ensure the exclusion of Catholics. In fact, 
Catholics could not serve as MPs before the 1829 Catholic Emancipation Act. In Scotland, the 45 MPs 
were elected in close boroughs in which the burgh corporations controlled the elections via a system of 
indirect election or in counties with very small electorates. While money was the source of corruption in 
England, patronage was the dominant means of influence in Scotland, giving the government of the day a 
large degree of control over the returns. 
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distribution of boroughs across the six franchise types and the approximate size of the 
electorate in 1830. The rules in the corporation, freeholder and burgage boroughs 
typically resulted in very small electorates. In contrast, boroughs with scot and lot, 
potwalloper or freeman franchise had relatively large electorates and usually held 
contested elections.  
There were, however, many exceptions, as the size of the electorate varied, not 
only between the different franchise types, but also within a given type. For example, 
some of the freeman boroughs had electorates totaling more than 5000 voters, e.g., 
Bristol, while others had fewer than 50, e.g., Hastings. Moreover, in Carlisle, the Earl of 
Lonsdale secured the freeman status for 14,000 coal miners, whom he employed so that 
they could vote for his candidates in the elections.  
[Table 1 here] 
The governance structure of a constituency, which determined who administered 
the borough or county on a day-to-day basis, was another institutional feature shaping its 
politics. Four governance types can be distinguished: municipal corporations, 
representative boroughs or boroughs with officials appointed at the court leet of the lord 
of the manor, universities and counties. As many as 164 out of the 214 English and all the 
Welsh boroughs had a municipal corporation, but the remaining 50 did not have any 
independent administrative structure. In these boroughs, patrons could be very influential. 
In contrast, in boroughs with a municipal corporation, which consisted of a mayor, 
aldermen, burgesses and other officials, there was a body that, in principle, could curb the 
influence of local patrons. For instance, Bodmin, Bath and Bury St Edmunds were 
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relative free from aristocratic influence, despite small electorates. However, many of the 
smaller corporations depended on the financial support of local patrons.  
2.2.3. Patrons and the openness of elections 
It is useful to think of the Unreformed Parliament along a line that measures the 
degree of aristocratic influence on the elections of MPs. At one end, there were the MPs 
for the most populous and independent counties, e.g., Yorkshire, and the two members 
for Westminster, a borough with a large and independent electorate known for its 
radicalism. At the other end, there were the MPs for the rotten boroughs, such as Gatton 
and Old Sarum, which were effectively owned by private individuals who nominated the 
MPs. In addition, the Treasury, i.e., the government of the day, also controlled the returns 
of several constituencies, usually through employment as in the docks of Chatham. As 
such, in 1827, John Wilson Croker, who was then Secretary to the Admiralty, estimated 
that as many as 276 seats were held by direct nomination (see Croker, 1884). As a rule of 
thumb, one can assume that the influence of patrons increases as one moves to the left 
across the columns and down across the rows of Table 1, towards the smaller boroughs. 
We use two measures to capture the influence of patrons in the constituencies. 
The first measure is an index that directly assesses the patrons’ influence and is based on 
the qualitative information provided by Philbin (1965). We divide the constituencies into 
five categories. We consider that there was a high degree of aristocratic influence in a 
constituency when (i) a single patron controlled the governing body of the borough or 
had ownership of the property to which voting rights were attached or when (ii) a single 
patron effectively nominated the MPs or a sharing arrangement between multiple patrons 
was in place, with each of the patrons nominating one MP. We consider that patrons had 
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an intermediate degree of influence when Philbin (1965) records that one, but not all the 
seats were controlled by a patron, or records evidence of rivalry between at least two 
patrons. We also single out the Treasury boroughs, which were under the patronage of the 
government, as well as the constituencies that are explicitly characterized as independent 
constituencies by Philbin (1965). Finally, we assume that there was a low degree of 
aristocratic influence when Philbin (1965) does not provide any specific information.16 
Table 2 shows that the majority of the English and Welsh constituencies were 
under some form of aristocratic or governmental influence in 1830. In view of our 
measure, it even appears that patrons directly controlled about 36 per cent of the 
boroughs. The counties were theoretically more independent than the boroughs because 
of their large electorates. Nevertheless, the landowning aristocracy also controlled the 
majority of county seats. 
[Table 2 here] 
 Our second measure of aristocratic influence is the extent to which the nine 
elections held between 1802 and 1831 were contested. In the vast majority of boroughs, 
less than half of the elections were contested, as Figure 2 shows. In a quarter of the 
boroughs, there was no contested election during the 30 years which preceded the 
Reform. Only in four boroughs - Beverley, Liverpool, Boston and Maidstone - were all 
nine elections contested between 1802 and 1831. Although county elections could be 
particularly expensive, elections did take place in at least 22 of the 40 English counties 
                                                 
16 Although this is likely to be an indication that the degree of patronage was low in these constituencies, 
this category might also contain constituencies for which information is simply missing irrespective of the 
“true” level of aristocratic influence. This last category is used in the statistical analysis as the control 
group. 
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during the period, while we know for a fact that no contest took place in eight of them. In 
Wales, contested elections were more common, with only three boroughs being entirely 
uncontested throughout the period (Philbin, 1965). For the purpose of the statistical 
analysis, we classify the constituencies into two categories: those with at least one 
contested election between 1802 and 1831 (“Contested Seat”) and those without any 
contested elections (“Uncontested Seat”).17  
[Figure 2 here] 
 2.3. Parliamentary reform and the Great Reform Act: some historical background 
In this section, we provide some historical background on the parliamentary 
reform movement in Great Britain and the events that led to the adoption of the Great 
Reform Act.  
2.3.1. The support for parliamentary reform before 1830 
The question of parliamentary reform had first arisen in the second half of the 
eighteenth century and resurfaced after the Napoleonic wars. Spurred on by post war 
economic distress, a reform movement outside Parliament led by the Radicals pushed for 
wide ranging reforms that included the secret ballot, yearly Parliaments and universal 
male suffrage. They campaigned against a system that was widely perceived as being 
corrupt and unrepresentative.18 But support amongst working men died out as trade 
                                                 
17 For some Welsh boroughs, we do not have definite information on the number of contested elections. We 
use these constituencies as the control group in the statistical analysis. 
18 O’Gorman (1989) challenged the traditional interpretation of the Unreformed Parliament as being corrupt 
and argued using detailed information from the poll books that the old system was relatively representative 
and participatory and less corrupt than it is usually given credit for. As pointed out by Pearce and Stearn 
(1994, page 23), this revisionist position builds on the study of a few boroughs which held regular 
elections. Thus, it is not clear if the picture of “vitality” rather than “corruption” can be generalized.  
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conditions improved. Thus, the Tory government of Lord Liverpool was both able and 
willing to severely repress the reform movement (Brock, 1973, chapter 1). By the late 
1820s, parliamentary reform seemed an unlikely prospect. Three events, however, 
contributed to putting reform back on the agenda.  
 First, Lord Liverpool, who had held together the Tory party since 1812, had a 
stroke in 1827, and was replaced first by Canning, then by Goderich and finally by the 
Duke of Wellington. This succession of leaders substantially weakened the anti-
reformers. Second, after the 1828 by-election in the Irish county of Clare which the 
Catholic lawyer Daniel O’Connell won, Wellington’s government was in a quandary: it 
faced a rebellion in Ireland if O’Connell was not allowed to take up his seat, or a split in 
the Tory party if he was, as this would make Catholic emancipation a reality. Wellington 
decided to sponsor the Catholic Relief Act, which passed with the votes of the Whigs in 
1829. The Tory government subsequently fell as the group of Ultra Tories, who were 
thoroughly opposed to Catholic emancipation, voted against it at the next opportunity in 
1830.19 The emancipation dealt a blow to the Tory party.20 Cannon (1973, p. 190) even 
considers that “the Catholic emancipation was the battering ram that broke down the old 
unreformed system”. Third, bad harvest and economic distress in 1829 renewed the extra-
                                                 
19Two factions of the Tory party had emerged in the 1820s. The Liberal Tories favored a cautious program 
of administrative reform and Catholic emancipation. The Ultra Tories opposed administrative reform and 
were anti-Catholic. Both groups were against parliamentary reform. Wellington represented the middle 
ground. The Whigs had supported Catholic emancipation since 1807. 
20 The Catholic Relief Act also had a side-effect in that the group of Ultra Tories at least temporarily 
became supporters of parliamentary reform. They argued that without sweeping reform, a new Catholic 
party, solidly based on the Irish constituencies, might improve its position by buying up close boroughs. 
The Ultra Tory Lord Blandford used this argument on 18 February 1830 when he presented a bill proposing 
that the rotten boroughs should be abolished and their seats transfer to the big cities and counties. The bill 
was defeated by 160 to 57. 
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parliamentary pressures for reform. For instance, the London Radical Association and the 
Birmingham Political Union among others were created at that time. These were to play 
an important role during the reform crisis in the following years.  
 Yet, in the first months of 1830, it seemed unlikely that parliamentary reform 
would be undertaken. In February, Lord Russell’s bill to give representation to 
Manchester, Birmingham and Leeds was defeated by 188 to 140 votes and in May, 
Daniel O’Connell’s radical bill demanding manhood suffrage only received 13 votes in 
support.  At the opening of the Parliament on 2 November 1830, Wellington declared that 
he would not bring forward reform under any circumstances, despite an unfavorable 
general election in July and social unrest in the Southern counties.21 
2.3.2. The reform crisis and the Great Reform Act 
The reform crisis was triggered by the fall of Wellington’s government on 15 
November 1830 after it had been defeated in a vote on a select committee22 that finally 
brought together the Ultra Tories and the Whigs in opposition to the government. This 
allowed Lord Grey to form the first Whig government since 1806. He immediately 
declared that his main objective was to introduce parliamentary reform. He carefully 
stressed to the committee members who were appointed to draft the bill that “the reform 
was to be large enough to satisfy public opinion” (Cannon, 1973, p. 204). At the same 
time, he also made it clear that the proposal should be based on property and existing 
                                                 
21 The election was triggered by the death of King George IV in June 1830. 
22 The select committee was to consider the Civil List, i.e., the money allocated to cover most of the 
expenses associated with the public duties of the King. Had Wellington’s cabinet accepted the appointment 
of a committee on this issue, it would have been a notable surrender. 
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franchises, thereby ruling out manhood suffrage, and that existing territorial divisions 
were to be maintained, thereby ruling out electoral districts of equal size.  
 The committee members based their deliberations on the principle that the small 
boroughs needed to be disenfranchised and that their seats should be given to the large 
cities and to the counties.23 They also favored the secret ballot, five-year Parliaments and 
a uniform £20 franchise for the boroughs, along with measures to cut down the cost of 
elections.24 However, when the proposal was presented to Lord Grey’s cabinet, the secret 
ballot was dropped. In addition, the £20 franchise, which had been suggested to 
counteract the effects of the secret ballot, was reduced to £10, as many boroughs that 
were to keep their two seats hardly had any £20 voters.25 It was also decided that the 
maximum duration of a Parliament should remain at seven years while some adjustments 
to the redistribution of seats would be introduced. 
 On 1 March 1831, Lord Russell presented the first of three reform bills in the 
Commons. Table 3 gives an overview of the votes on the three versions of the reform bill 
while the Appendix outlines the content of the initial and final bills. It is clear from Table 
3 that participation was very high, in particular in the first two votes where more than 90 
per cent of all MPs voted. For the vote on 21 September 1831, when it had become clear 
that the bill would pass in the Commons, participation dropped to 73 per cent. 
                                                 
23 The committee members used a cut-off of 2,000 inhabitants as recorded in the 1821 census to determine 
which boroughs should lose both seats, a cut-off of 4,000 inhabitants to determine which boroughs should 
lose one seat and allocated the seats to cities with more than 10,000 inhabitants. The suggested 
redistribution of seats to the counties was also based on population numbers (see Brock, 1973, Table 3). 
24 These measures concerned the registration of voters, the length of the polling (reduced to two days) and 
the creation of multiple polling stations. 
25 Even with £10 as the cut-off, some boroughs had very few voters. For example, Amersham with a 
population of 2612 would only have 25 £10 voters. 
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After nine days of debate, the bill passed with a single vote, 302 against 301, on 22 
March 1831. It is interesting to note that the English borough MPs divided 171-200 
against, but that 60 of the MPs elected in boroughs that stood to lose one of their two 
seats, or their two seats altogether, supported the bill. The English counties supported the 
bill (51 to 25), as did the MPs elected in Wales (13-10). The Scottish MPs voted against 
(13-25) and the Irish votes in favor of reform (51-36) were pivotal.26  Table 3 clearly 
shows that party affiliation is a very strong predictor of the MPs’ vote on the reform 
bill27: more than 96 per cent of the Whigs and all the Radicals voted in favor while more 
than 85 per cent of the Tories voted against. Yet, the minority of about 15 per cent 
“liberal” Tories who supported the bill played a key role in getting it through the 
Commons and more than compensated for the few dissenting Whigs who did not support 
the government. However, at the committee stage, Lord Grey’s government was defeated 
on an amendment pertaining to the number of MPs to be returned in England and 
Wales.28 As a consequence, Lord Grey asked the King to dissolve the Parliament on 19 
April 1831. 
[Table 3 here] 
 Between October 1830 and April 1831, the British Parliament received more than 
3000 petitions, mostly in favor of reform (see Cannon, 1973, p. 214). In this heated 
political atmosphere, the general election in 1831 was effectively a referendum on 
                                                 
26 See Brock (1973, Table 4). Most of the Ultra Tories who had voted against Wellington’s government in 
1830 opposed the bill. 
27 The vote of each MP was obtained from the Parliamentary Debates (1830, 1831). 
28 Including the adjustments proposed by Grey at the opening of the committee stage, the bill implied a 
total loss of 31 seats across England and Wales. 
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parliamentary reform. Many Tories were not returned and the election results gave the 
Whigs the majority they needed to pursue the reform.  
Lord Russell introduced the second reform bill shortly after the election on 24 
June 1831. Except for minor adjustments related to the boroughs that were to lose seats, it 
was identical to the first reform bill. At the second reading on 6 July 1831, it passed with 
a majority of 367 against 231, reflecting the outcome of the 1831 general election. At the 
committee stage, it was, however, amended by the Tories with an important clause, 
suggested by the Marquis of Chandos. The Chandos clause gave the right to vote in the 
counties to tenants-at-will who rented property worth at least £50. It was a clear attempt 
to shift the balance of the bill toward the landowning aristocracy. Acknowledging that 
another general election would be counterproductive, Lord Grey allowed a third reading 
of the bill with the Chandos clause on 21 September 1831. It passed with 346 votes 
against 235. 
 The next day, on 22 September 1831, Lord Russell presented the bill to the House 
of Lords. The Lords rejected the bill after five days of heated debate leading to a 
parliamentary deadlock. At the same time, riots broke out in many parts of the country 
and an alarming rise in the militancy of the political unions was observed.29  
It was in this volatile political environment that Lord Russell presented the third 
reform bill in the House of Commons on 12 December 1831, after a period of intense 
lobbying of many peers and with some modifications to appease Tory critics.30 The bill 
                                                 
29Several people were killed in riots that took place in Bristol. In another incident, the Duke of Newcastle’s 
castle was burnt.  
30 The main modifications to the bill were a remodeling of schedule B (listing the boroughs to lose one 
seat) where 11 boroughs were allowed to retain both seats; a redistribution of 10 extra seats to the large un-
represented towns; and a continuation of the freeman qualification in the boroughs 
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passed the second reading with a majority of 324 against 162 on 17 December 1831 and 
proceeded through the committee stage without any significant amendments.  
 In the months leading up to the presentation of the third bill to the House of 
Lords, Lord Grey had suggested to King William IV that the creation of additional Whig 
peers might be needed to pass the reform. The King was however reluctant to commit to 
such a measure. The third bill was presented to the Lords on 26 March 1832. After the 
Bishop of London and two other leading Tory peers announced that they would support 
the bill, it passed the second reading in April with a narrow majority of nine votes, seven 
of which were proxy votes that could not be used at the committee stage. And 
unsurprisingly, things went wrong at the committee stage, where Duke of Wellington and 
Robert Peel were ready to introduce a series of significant amendments that would have 
changed the very nature of the reform bill. As soon as the committee stage opened on 7 
May 1832, Lord Grey found himself in minority.  
The next day, Lord Grey informed King William IV that he would resign failing 
the creation of enough Whig peers to carry the bill. Upon the King’s refusal to create 
Whig peers, Lord Grey stepped down. The King’s message to any new Tory government, 
however, was very clear: any government had to undertake an extensive reform measure 
to “secure tranquility”. This put the Tories in a dilemma for which they had no solution 
since Robert Peel – the only Tory with any chance of commanding respect in the 
Commons – declined to lead a pro-reform Tory government. In the meantime, petitions 
kept coming in expressing significant popular support for reform while riots and talks of 
an armed uprising were reported throughout the country. In the end, the attempt to form a 
Tory government failed. Lord Grey was recalled by the King on 18 May 1832 and given 
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a promise of the creation of 50 new Whig peers if need be. The third bill then passed the 
third reading of the Lords with a 106 to 22 majority: the Great Reform Act was a reality.  
 As can be seen in the Appendix, the final bill that was given royal assent on 7 
June 1832 was slightly different from the first bill presented to the Commons two years 
earlier. It nevertheless carried out the main principles of the franchise extension and 
redistribution of seats. Historians have, however, argued about the significance of the bill 
and whether it deserves the adjective “great”. Its immediate effect was to increase the 
number of voters from about 478,000 to about 800,000 i.e., from three to eight per cent of 
the total population. This basically enfranchised the middle class in the boroughs, but in 
most places the electorates continued to be very small. This restricted electorate, 
combined with the lack of a secret ballot, allowed many patrons to retain substantial 
influence in the elections. The redistribution of seats gave representation to the industrial 
centers, while the landowning aristocracy gained through an increase in the number of 
county seats. Contested elections became more common in the decades after the reform, 
up from about 30 per cent to about 60 per cent (Cannon, 1973, Appendix 3). However, 
the social origins and the occupations of the MPs who were returned before and 
immediately after the reform were very similar (Wolley, 1938).  
Arguably, the Great Reform Act was mostly great because it was the first in a 
sequence of reforms of the British political system. It opened up the door for a reform of 
the municipal corporations and the poor laws in the second half of the 1830s, for the 
factory act, the repeal of the Corn Laws and the permanent introduction of the income tax 
in the 1840s. It got the snowball rolling. 
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3. Hypotheses and Methodology  
In this section, we present the four hypotheses that we test and the methodology 
which we adopt to do so. 
3.1. Hypotheses 
The literature on franchise extension has developed several theories to explain the 
willingness of an elite to share its power with broader segments of the population. Our 
data on the votes of the MPs and on the characteristics of the constituencies where they 
were elected is a new and promising ground for testing these theories. We have singled 
out four prominent hypotheses that the data allow us to test.  
Modernization theory contends that the extension of the franchise was caused by 
the rise of a middle class, which ultimately sought to shift the balance of power from the 
landowning aristocracy to the industrial and commercial interests (see Moore, 1966). 
Along similar lines, Congleton (2004) argues that industrialization created new economic 
and ideological interest groups. The rise of these groups changed the constitutional 
bargaining process and triggered political reforms. Both of these theories suggest that the 
extension of the franchise and other political reforms are driven by changes in economic 
and social structures and give prominence to the role of the middle class. We can 
summarize this as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: The rise of a middle class, along with economic prosperity, generated 
support for the Great Reform Act. 
The historical narrative stresses the role of extra-parliamentary agitation in favor 
of reform (Cannon, 1973, chap. 10). However, historians still debate whether the Great 
Reform Act was supported by large sections of the British electorate, or was a project 
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entirely driven by the elite (see Evans (2000) among others). This debate motivates our 
second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The Great Reform Act had widespread electoral support. 
A prominent idea in the economics literature on franchise reform is that the elite 
might have extended the franchise in order to avoid a violent and costly revolution. For 
example, Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2005) point out that democratization can serve 
as a commitment device in situations in which the elite cannot promise redistribution or 
other public spending programs to appease the poor.31 According to this view, franchise 
extensions are triggered by external threats so that we may conjecture: 
Hypothesis 3: The votes of the MPs were influenced by the threat of revolution. 
The “Enlightenment view” argues that a significant fraction of the elite supported 
the extension of the franchise because their social values changed as they adopted more 
liberal ideas (Tilly, 2004). This line of thought suggests that the conflict within the elite 
about the extension of the franchise was not motivated by economic or personal interest 
but by ideology.32 This gives rise to the fourth hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: The votes of the MPs were influenced by ideology rather than by economic 
or personal interests. 
These four hypotheses all presume that voters had a minimum of independence 
when they elected the MPs, and that once elected, the MPs had some leeway when 
voting. This is unlikely to have been the case in the 56 boroughs that were 
                                                 
31 See also Boix (2003). Justman and Gradstein (1999) envisage a more gradual process where increasing 
alienation of the disenfranchised leads to piecemeal suffrage reform, rather than to an abrupt extension of 
the franchise. 
32 Lizzeri and Persico (2004) also argue that the extension of the franchise was driven by a conflict of 
interest among the members of the elite, but they focus on conflicts along economic lines.  
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disenfranchised by the Reform. In these constituencies, patrons tightly controlled who 
was elected as well as the MPs’ votes. It is therefore reasonable to restrict our attention to 
the sample of constituencies that were not disenfranchised by the Great Reform Act. Still, 
as a robustness check we also ran estimations on the full sample of constituencies and on 
the sub-sample of disenfranchised boroughs, which we show in the Appendix.33 
3.2 Econometric design 
Figure 3 sums up our econometric approach. We estimate two equations for each 
of the four votes on the Reform Bills listed in Table 3. The first equation is a party 
affiliation equation that identifies the factors that led to the election of a Whig or of a 
Tory in a constituency.34 The second equation is a vote equation that explains the MP’s 
vote in Parliament. This approach is based on the premise that the political characteristics 
of the constituencies, such as the voting franchise, the governance structure and the 
extent of aristocratic patronage, had an impact not only on the party affiliation of the 
elected MPs, but also on their subsequent votes on the reform bills. In contrast, we 
consider that the occupational structure of a constituency and its economic circumstances 
only affected the election of the MPs, while the MPs’ occupation and personal 
background did not have an effect on their electoral success but had an impact on their 
votes. 
                                                 
33 In the estimations over the full sample, we include a dummy variable equal to 1 for the constituencies 
that were disenfranchised by the Great Reform Act (the “Disenfranchised Borough” variable). It is 
interesting to note that many constituencies without any contested election were not disenfranchised by the 
Reform Act so that the “Disenfranchised Borough” and the “Uncontested Seat” variables do not overlap 
perfectly.  
34 To simplify the analysis, we assume in our estimations that Radicals and Whigs belong to the same 
political group (largely) in favor of reforms. In the following, we shall refer to them simply as the Whigs. 
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[Figure 3 here] 
This premise complicates the estimation of the vote and party affiliation equations, 
which cannot be done separately. But when estimating these two equations together, we 
want to avoid sample selection bias in the vote equation. Sample selection bias may arise 
if we do not correctly distinguish between the factors that lead to the election of a Tory or 
of a Whig MP on the one hand, and his support or opposition to the bill on the other 
hand.35 To overcome this problem, we use the two-stage estimator of Heckman (1979). In 
this framework, the party affiliation equation is the selection equation and the vote 
equation is the outcome equation. 36 
To explain the procedure, let us first focus on the Whigs and let the dummy variable 
whig take the value 1 if an elected MP from a constituency is a Whig and zero otherwise. 
However, it is assumed that we only observe a vote in favor of the reform bill if an 
unobserved latent variable, whig*, exceeds a threshold. That is 
ηγγγ +++= 22110* '' XXwhig      (1) 
and  
 
⎩⎨
⎧ ≥=
otherwise 0
0 if 1 *whig
whig       (2) 
                                                 
35 It may even be hypothesized that some factors explain why a MP voted in favor of the reform in one of 
the earlier (respectively, later) votes but not in the subsequent (preceding) votes. This explains why we 
report four first-stage estimations, one for each of the four votes, even though our sample only covers two 
general elections. 
36 The analogy between this study and Heckman (1979)’s study on the determinants of female wages is as 
follows. To understand the determinants of female wages, one cannot only examine the individual 
characteristics of women who work. In addition, one cannot assume that the decision to work and the 
determinants of wages are identical. Therefore, in a first step, one should explain why some women work 
while others choose not to. In a second step, the determinants of female wages can be analyzed on a sample 
that is restricted to working women. 
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where 1X  and 2X  are two matrices of explanatory variables and η  is an error term that 
follows a standard normal distribution. The matrix 1X  includes the variables related to 
the political and institutional characteristics of each constituency while the matrix 2X  
includes the variables related to the occupational and economic structure of the 
constituency. The selection equation in the first stage of Heckman’s two-stage procedure 
is estimated as a probit model and identifies the characteristics of the constituencies that 
returned Whig MPs 
 )()1Pr( 2
'
21
'
10 γγγ XXFwhig ++==     (3) 
where F represents the standard normal cumulative distribution function.  
 From the estimated parameters of the probit model in equation (3), we compute 
the estimated hazard rate λˆ . It is equal to 
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( )2211
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ˆˆ
ˆˆˆ
γγ
γγλ ⋅+⋅
⋅+⋅=
XXF
XXf
      (4) 
where ( 21 ˆ,ˆ γγ ) is the vector of estimated parameters from equation (3) and ( ).f  is the 
probability density function of a standard normal distribution. We can then use λˆ  to 
normalize the mean of the true error term of the vote equation to zero. This generates 
consistent estimators for the second step of the two-stage procedure. The outcome 
equation, i.e., the vote equation, can then be estimated by the following probit model 
== )1Pr( for 2'31'10( φφφ XXF ++ )λˆσ ⋅+     (5) 
where the dummy variable for equals the value 1 if the Whig MP voted in favor of the 
reform and 0 otherwise, σ  is the standard deviation of the true error term of the vote 
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equation, and 3X  is a matrix of variables related to the MPs’ occupations and 
background. 
If the coefficient that is associated with the hazard rate is insignificant at the 5 per 
cent level, the estimation of the vote equation in the second stage is not affected by a 
sample selection bias. In other words, the estimation of the two equations correctly 
distinguishes between, on the one hand, the factors that led to the elections of Whig MPs, 
and, on the other hand, the factors that explain the votes of the elected MPs. 
We repeat this estimation procedure to explain the votes of the Tory MPs who 
opposed the reform. We use in equation (3) the variable tory instead of whig, where tory 
equals 1 if a Tory MP was elected and 0 otherwise. In equation (5), we use the variable 
against instead of for, where against equals 1 if the Tory MP opposed the reform and 0 
otherwise. 
4. Results 
The main results are presented in Tables 4 and 5. As noted above, the underlying 
estimations are based on the sub-sample of constituencies that were not disenfranchised.37 
More specifically, Table 4 shows the estimated vote and party affiliation equations for the 
Whig MPs while Table 5 presents the equivalent estimations for the Tory MPs. Each 
Table has two panels. In the top panel, we report the estimations of the vote equation and 
in the lower panel, we display the estimates of the party affiliation equation. Accordingly, 
                                                 
37 The corresponding estimations for the whole sample and for the sub-sample of disenfranchised 
constituencies are reported in the Appendix. The results of these additional estimations are consistent with 
the conclusions we draw below. 
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each Table contains four estimations, one for each of the four votes that took place on 22 
March 1831, 6 July 1831, 20 September 1831 and 17 December 1831.38  
[Table 4 here] [Table 5 here] 
4.1. The middle class, economic prosperity and the Great Reform Act 
To test Hypothesis 1, which contends that economic prosperity and the rise of the 
middle class were the causes of reform, we examine the impact of the economic 
circumstances and the occupational structure of the constituencies on the election of MPs. 
In particular, Hypothesis 1 implies that the constituencies that were thriving at the time of 
the reform would return pro-reform Whigs, while the constituencies that were undergoing 
an economic decline would return anti-reform Tories. The two variables - Thriving 
Economy and Declining Economy – which pertain to the economic circumstances in the 
constituencies allow us to perform this test directly.  
The lower panel of Table 5 shows that constituencies with a thriving economy were 
more likely to return Tories, while the evidence in Table 4, if anything, suggests that 
Whigs were unlikely to be returned in constituencies with a declining economy. It would 
thus appear, contrary to Hypothesis 1, that constituencies with prosperous economic 
circumstances supported politicians who were, in general, opposed to the Great Reform 
Act. 
In addition, Hypothesis 1 implies that constituencies which were mainly populated 
by groups associated with a burgeoning middle-class, such as traders, artisans or 
                                                 
38 We selected the shown specifications where the hazard rate λ is insignificant, indicating that the vote 
equation is not affected by a selection bias. As a result, the reported estimations do not necessarily contain 
the same set of variables.  
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professionals, would return pro-reform Whigs.39 We test this conjecture by examining the 
impact of the variables capturing the occupational structure of the constituencies on the 
elections of the MPs in the first step of the Heckman model.  
The results in lower panel of Table 4 suggest that Whigs were more likely to be 
returned in constituencies with a high share of agricultural workers, industry workers and 
artisans in the 1831 election. Table 5 is consistent with this, as it shows that Tories were 
less likely to be returned in constituencies dominated by these occupational groups. 
Taken together, these observations suggest that the economic changes that were 
producing more cohesive working and middle classes might have been an engine for 
reform. This lends some support to Hypothesis 1. 
All in all, it is possible to reconcile our conflicting results by distinguishing 
between the long-term and the short-term. In the long-term, economic growth created 
groups of affluent individuals, distinct from the landowning aristocracy, who wanted to 
have a say in political affairs. In the short-term, the downturn in economic activity made 
these individuals bolder in their demands. But they met popular opposition originating 
from the constituencies that withstood recession and economic hardship. This 
interpretation would reconcile the emerging middle classes’ support for reform with the 
historical narrative alluded to above which suggests that the reform movement was given 
a new impetus by the recession that started in 1829.  
4.2 Elitist and popular support for the Great Reform Act 
Hypothesis 2 suggests that the Great Reform Act enjoyed popular support among 
the electorate of the Unreformed Parliament. To test this, we investigate whether the 
                                                 
39 Even though middle-class voters could not always vote, it may be conjectured that the MPs were 
receptive to the demands of middle-class residents living in their constituencies. 
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differences in the electoral success of the pro-reform Whigs and anti-reform Tories can 
be explained by the franchise type and the degree of patronage in the constituencies 
where they were elected. If the reform had popular support, then the Whigs would mostly 
have been returned in large and open constituencies. Conversely, if the bulk of the 
electorate opposed the reform which was merely a project driven by the elite, then the 
Whigs would have been elected in close boroughs where the influence of patrons was 
high and the electorate small. 
The lower panels of Tables 4 and 5 show that Whigs (respectively, Tories) were 
more (less) likely to be returned in boroughs with a scot and lot franchise, which often 
allowed for a large electorate. In addition, the Whigs (Tories) were likely to lose (win) in 
boroughs with a corporation franchise and in burgage boroughs, where the electorate was 
often very restricted. Furthermore, the lower panels of Tables 4 and 5 indicate that 
constituencies with a municipal corporation, which could be relatively free from 
aristocratic influence, were more likely to return Whig MPs and less likely to return Tory 
MPs. We can also note that Tories were elected in constituencies with a substantial 
degree of aristocratic influence, while Whigs were not, at least in the 1831 election.  
Overall, these observations suggest that pro-reform Whigs were returned in 
constituencies with open elections while Tories were typically not. In addition, Tory 
candidates were usually successful in boroughs where aristocratic influence was high. 
This is consistent with Hypothesis 2. As a matter of fact, the Tories virtually lost all 
popular support in the 1831 general election. Of the 187 Tory candidates returned by the 
English boroughs, 165 represented boroughs that were to lose their seats or with less than 
400 voters, and only six of the MPs returned in the counties were Tories (Cannon, 1973, 
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p. 221). Still, the Great Reform Act could clearly not have been adopted without the 
support from a substantial part of the Whig elite. Indeed, many Whig MPs were returned 
in counties and in boroughs where patrons had at least some control over the electorate.  
4.3. The threat of revolution and the Great Reform Act 
In the absence of a direct constituency-specific measure of the threat of 
revolution, our test of Hypothesis 3 is indirect: it is based on the fact that the perceived or 
real threat of political violence substantially increased during the late autumn of 1831. 
This is clearly demonstrated by Tilly (1995)’s work on contentious gatherings in Great 
Britain. He reports that there were less than 50 such gatherings in June, July and August 
1831, but more than 300 in October 1831. If the threat of revolution exercised an 
influence on the attitude of the MPs towards reform, Hypothesis 3 suggests that there 
would be systematic differences between the votes held in July 1831 and in December 
1831. In particular, we should observe a dramatic change in the influence of patrons on 
the votes of the MPs. In the low-tension environment of July 1831, they should have been 
hostile to reform and instructed the MPs under their influence to oppose the reform. But 
in the last months of 1831, which were characterized by high political tensions, they 
should have abandoned their stance against the extension of the franchise and encouraged 
the MPs under their influence to support the reform bill. 
An important piece of evidence in support of Hypothesis 3 comes from Table 4. 
From the top panel, we note a shift in the vote of Whig MPs who were returned in the 
constituencies where patrons partially controlled the electorate: these MPs did not 
support parliamentary reform until the vote held on 17 December 1831. This result can be 
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interpreted as evidence that the increase in the threat of revolution in the autumn of 1831 
caused some Whig patrons to change their mind and support reform.  
In addition, the threat of revolution seemed to have had an impact on the vote 
patterns of one particular group of Whig MPs: those with an army career. While these 
MPs were likely to vote against the reform bill in the first critical vote held on 22 March 
1831, they did not demonstrate any opposition in the subsequent votes. It may be 
hypothesized that Whig officers did not want to take part in suppressing the revolt that 
might have been triggered if the Parliament failed to extend the franchise. 
However, the threat of revolution did not soften the stance of Tory MPs against 
the reform, as can be seen in the top panel of Table 5. Their anti-reform stance was 
supported by their patrons, whose influence is more significant in the final than in the 
first votes. This observation suggests that the mobilization of the Tory aristocrats against 
the reform bill in the 1831 election, which was almost exclusively fought on the reform 
question, prevented a landslide victory for the Whigs. 
Overall, our results suggest that the threat of revolution did influence some Whig 
patrons and MPs who initially opposed the reform and made them change their mind. 
However, they also indicate that social unrest hardened the anti-reform stance of the Tory 
MPs and of their patrons. The evidence in favor of Hypothesis 3 is, therefore, mixed. It 
points to an interesting asymmetry in the effects of external threats in the voting behavior 
of reluctant reformers and anti-reform hardliners. 
4.4. Ideology, self-interest and the Great Reform Act 
Insofar as opposite ideologies can be captured by party affiliations, Hypothesis 4 
can be tested by investigating whether the voting patterns of Whig and Tory MPs were 
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dissimilar. These differences should be most pronounced in the constituencies that were 
either fully or partially controlled by patrons. This is because Whig (respectively, Tory) 
patrons would have instructed the MPs whose vote they controlled to support (oppose) 
the reform bills. However, if Hypothesis 4 is false so that economic and social interests, 
rather than ideology, drove the vote, then both Whig and Tory patrons should have 
opposed the extension of the franchise. Moreover, we would have to reject Hypothesis 4 
if Tory and Whig MPs with the same occupations voted in the same manner and not 
according to their party affiliation as this would indicate that personal interests were more 
important than ideology in shaping their votes. 
The upper panels of both Tables 4 and 5 suggest that the votes of Whig and Tory 
MPs were very different and, as such, mirrored the opposite stance of their patrons. 
Indeed, a substantial number of Whig patrons allowed, and maybe even instructed, their 
MPs to support the Reform Act, even tough it would undermine their political influence. 
It would therefore seem that ideology played a significant part in the success of the 
reform bill.  
Ideology is also a convincing explanation for the support that Tory financiers gave 
to the reform bill (see the upper panel of Table 5). They were the sole group of Tory MPs 
to consistently support the extension of the franchise. It may be that, because of their 
profession, they were more in touch with the aspirations of the emerging middle-class 
than Tory landowners and therefore felt less threatened by the prospect of reform.  
However, some of our results suggest that many MPs were motivated by their self-
interest, and not by principles, when they voted. Not surprisingly, both the Whigs and the 
Tories who were returned in boroughs that were to be disenfranchised tended to oppose 
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the reform (See Tables A3 and A5 in Appendix). More interestingly, we find that Whig 
industry owners were likely to oppose the reform during the third reading of the second 
reform bill on 17 December 1831. It is possible that Whig industry owners worried that a 
reform would give industry workers the power to demand new economic rights. They 
were joined in their opposition to the bill by Tory MPs who had a relative in Parliament. 
These MPs were undoubtedly heirs to political dynasties and they were mainly interested 
in preserving the old political order.  
All in all, our results clearly suggest that ideology was an important engine of 
parliamentary reform. At the same time, the evidence also implies that the opposition to 
the reform was, at least partly, driven by economic and social interests, i.e., by patronage 
and by the MPs’ personal interests.  
5. Conclusion 
In this study, we offer a new approach to the study of political reform and 
democratization. We provide an econometric analysis of the factors that led to the 
adoption of the Great Reform Act in Great Britain in 1832. We assess the relative 
importance of factors such as economic growth, ideology or the threat of revolution in 
explaining the willingness of an elite to extend the franchise. For this purpose, we 
collected an extensive dataset from primary and secondary sources on the British 
economy and polity under the Unreformed Parliament.  
The study yields four main results. First, modernization theory only receives mixed 
support. While the economic changes that created more cohesive working and middle 
classes spurred the reform process, prosperous constituencies in the 1830s were likely to 
return anti-reform MPs to Parliament. Second, the reform enjoyed some measure of 
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popular support. In particular, we find that pro-reform MPs were more likely to be 
elected in constituencies with relatively large electorates and contested elections. Third, 
the threat of revolution had an asymmetric impact on the voting behavior of the pro-
reform Whigs and of the anti-reform Tories. It convinced reluctant reformers among the 
Whig MPs and their patrons – to support the bill, but strengthened the anti-reform stance 
of the Tories. Fourth, ideology played a critical role in the adoption of the Great Reform 
Act. Nonetheless, self-interest and political expedience also explained the votes of many 
MPs. 
Our findings have interesting implications for the broader literature on franchise 
reform. First, the theoretical model of franchise reform developed by Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2000, 2006) assumed that all the members of the elite perceive the threat of 
revolution similarly and agree on how to avoid violent political change. However, our 
results suggest that the members of the elite were divided on the appropriate answer to 
the threat of revolution. Therefore, an alternative modeling strategy would take into 
account that some members of the elite may prefer concessions, i.e., an extension of the 
franchise, while others prefer repression. This would add an additional dimension of 
conflict to the model which may generate richer and more realistic regime dynamics. 
Second, Acemoglu et al. (2008) recently challenged modernization theory and showed 
that the existence of a causal link between economic development and democratization is 
doubtful. Our results cast further doubt on the relevance of this theory. Third, O’Gorman 
(1989) challenged the view that the Unreformed Parliament was entirely corrupt and 
controlled by patrons. Instead, he painted a picture of “vitality” and suggested that the old 
system was fairly representative and open to competition. Our results clearly show that 
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patrons played an important role in the Unreformed Parliament and that they controlled 
many MPs. Nevertheless, we do find some evidence of “vitality”. In particular, the votes 
of many MPs reflected their personal interests rather than that of their patrons or party. 
Our approach to the study of democratization may be used to analyze other reforms 
beside the Great Reform Act. It only requires that the politicians who were elected under 
pre-reform rules voted on the extension of franchise. The subsequent reforms of the 
British Parliament in 1867, 1884, and 1918 are, therefore, promising cases for further 
study. Another promising avenue of future research pertains to the study of the many 
failed reform attempts that took place in the 50 years prior to the Great Reform Act. 
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Appendices.  
A1. Appendix A: The franchise bills. 
On 1 March 1831, Lord Russell presented the first of three reform bills in the 
Commons. The main features of this first reform bill were (Brock, 1973, Table 3): 
1) 60 boroughs (listed in schedule A) were to be disenfranchised entirely, a further 47 
boroughs (listed in schedule B) were to lose one seat, and Weymouth was to lose two 
seats out of four. 
2) 11 new two-seat and 21 one-seat borough constituencies were to be created (in the 
previously un-represented towns with over 10,000 inhabitants listed in schedule C) 
and 6 new seats should be created in the un-represented parts of London (schedule 
D). 
3) Each of the three Ridings of Yorkshire were to have two seats; 26 of the other English 
counties were to gain two additional seats, up from two to four (schedule E); the Isle 
of Wight was to be given one seat.  
4) The county franchise was to be given to all 40-shilling freeholders, to £10 per year 
copyholders and to £50 per year leaseholders (with a lease of 21 years at least). 
5) The borough franchise was to be given to adult male occupiers of houses worth at 
least £10 per year who had owned the property for at least one year, had paid all the 
relevant taxes on it and had not received poor relief in the previous year. All existing 
electors were to retain their right to vote for life if resident. 
6) Open voting was to remain. 
7) The maximum length of a Parliament was set at seven years. 
8) A register of voters was to be established in both boroughs and counties. 
The final bill that was given Royal assent on 7 June 1832 was different from that 
first presented to the Commons two years earlier, but carried over the main principles 
(Brock, 1973, Table 3): 
1) 56 boroughs (listed in schedule A) were disenfranchised entirely, a further 30 
boroughs (listed in schedule B) lost one seat, and Weymouth lost two members out of 
four. 
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2) 22 new two-seat and 21 one-seat borough constituencies were created in the 
previously un-represented towns with over 10,000 inhabitants and in London. 
3) Each of the three ridings of Yorkshire was given two seats; 26 of the other English 
counties gained two extra seats, up from two to four; the Isle of Wight was given one 
seat.  
4) The county franchise was to be given to all 40-shilling freeholders; to £10 per year 
copyholders; to £50 per year leaseholders (with a lease of 20 years at least); to £10 
per year leaseholders (with a lease of 60 years at least); to £50 tenant-at-will, if 
occupiers. 
5) The borough franchise was given to adult male occupiers of houses worth at least £10 
per year who owned the property for at least one year, had paid all the relevant taxes 
on it and had not received poor relief in the previous year. The rights of the current 
freemen were extended to the future freemen, provided these rights a) were acquired 
through birth or apprenticeship and b) if acquired through birth, these rights must 
have been derived from qualification existing before March 1831. All other existing 
electors were to retain their right to vote for life if resident. 
6) Open voting was to remain. 
7) The maximum length of a Parliament was set at seven years. 
8) A register of voters was to be established in both boroughs and counties. 
A.2. Appendix B: Descriptive statistics. 
Table A1 presents some descriptive statistics for the variables we use in this 
study.  
[Table A1 here] 
 
A.3. Appendix C: Supplementary estimations. 
The Tables we present below display estimation results on the whole sample and 
on the sub-sample of disenfranchised boroughs, for the Whigs and the Tories. They are 
organized like Tables 4 and 5. 
[Table A2 here][Table A3 here] [Table A4 here] [Table A5 here] 
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Table 1. The Size and Type of the Borough Constituencies in England and Wales in 1830. 
 
 Franchise type 
Size of the electorate A Scot and Lot 
B 
Potwalloper 
C 
Freeman 
D  
Freeholder 
E 
Corporation 
 F 
Burgage 
Total 
1. Over 5000 1 1 5    7 
2. 1001-5000 6 2 25 4   37 
3. 601-1000 8 5 11 1   25 
4. 301-600 11 1 16    28 
5. 101-300 8 5 12 1 1 10 37 
6. 51-100 4  5  2 10 21 
7. 50 or less 2  14  27 15 58 
Total 40 14 88 6 30 35 213 
 
Notes:  
• The coding of the English boroughs is given in the notes to Table 2 in Brock (1973). For the Welsh 
boroughs the coding is as follows. A3. Flint. A4. Haverfordwest. E7. Beaumaris. C2. Pembroke. C3. 
Cardiff, Carmartheren. C4. Cardigan, Carnarvon, Denbigh. C5. Radnor. C7. Brecon. Information on the 
number of voters in Montgomery, which was a freeman borough, is not available. 
• In the freemen boroughs, all individuals with the freeman status were allowed to vote, whether or not they 
resided in the boroughs. The freeman status could be inherited, acquired by serving an apprenticeship in the 
borough, or received as an honor from the borough’s corporation. 
• In the scot and lot boroughs, inhabitants who paid the poor rates could vote.  
• In the potwalloper boroughs, all the resident householders who “had a family and boiled a pot” could 
vote.  
• In the freeholder boroughs, the franchise requirement was the same as in the English counties, i.e., a 40-
shilling qualification. 
• In the burgage boroughs, the owners of a property with an old form of tenure, called the burgage, could 
vote. These were often limited to plots of land that had formed the borough when it was first laid out and 
could be owned by a single person.  
• In the corporation boroughs, only members of the local town council, called the corporation, could vote. 
The franchise was therefore restricted to the mayor and members of the town corporation who were co-
opted by a small group of burgesses rather than elected. This often resulted in very narrow electorates. 
• Sources: Brock (1973, Table 2) for the 202 English boroughs, Philbin (1965), and the authors’ own 
coding for the Welsh boroughs. 
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Table 2. Aristocratic influence and patronage in England and Wales under the Unreformed Parliament. 
 
Patronage English 
Boroughs 
Welsh 
Boroughs 
English 
Counties 
Welsh 
Counties 
English 
Universities 
Total 
High influence 73 2 8 4 0 87 
Some influence 70 8 16 7 0 101 
Low influence 25 1 10 0 2 38 
No influence 20 1 5 1 0 27 
Treasury borough 13 0 1b 0 0 14 
Total 201a 12 40 12 2 267 
 
Notes:  
• a. We do not have information for New Sarum (also known as Salisbury).  
• b. Hampshire would always return “court nominees”. 
• Source: Own coding based on Philbin (1965). 
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Table 3. Overview of the four votes on the Reform Bills examined in the study. 
 
Data of vote Bill Parliament Votes for Votes against 
22 March 1930 Second reading of the first Reform Bill. 1830 Parliament Whig: 248 
Radical: 6 
Tory: 48 
Total: 302 (238) 
Whig: 8 
Radical: 0 
Tory: 293 
Total: 301 (240) 
6 July 1831 Second reading of the second Reform Bill. 1831 Parliament Whig: 316 
Radical: 10 
Tory: 41 
Total: 367 (285) 
Whig: 5 
Radical: 0 
Tory: 227 
Total: 232 (192) 
21 September 1831 Third reading of the second Reform Bill. 1831 Parliament Whig: 302 
Radical: 10 
Tory: 34 
Total: 346 (274) 
Whig: 5 
Radical: 0 
Tory: 232 
Total: 235 (179) 
17 December 1831 Second reading of the third Reform Bill. 1831 Parliament Whig: 285 
Radical: 4 
Tory: 35 
Total: 324 (266) 
Whig: 4 
Radical: 0 
Tory: 158 
Total: 162 (131) 
 
Notes: 
• The votes for and against on the Reform Bills refer to all MPs, including those representing Scotland and 
Ireland. The votes in the bracket refer to the MPs from England and Wales. 
• Source: Parliamentary Debates, various years. 
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Table 4. Determinants of the Whigs’ election and support for reform: all the constituencies excluding the disenfranchised boroughs 
 
 Vote equation of the Whig support for Reform 
  22 March 1831 6 July 1831 20 September 1831 17 December 1831 
      
Patronage High influence 0.01 0.003 0.00 0.037 
  [0.106] [0.060] [0.034] [0.024] 
 Some influence -0.054 0.016 0.006 0.044 
  [0.085] [0.060] [0.033] [0.023]* 
 No influence 0.212 0.02 0.038 0.042 
  [0.106]** [0.054] [0.030] [0.021]* 
 Treasury borough -0.111 0.072 0.034 0.026 
  [0.127] [0.070] [0.039] [0.027] 
Governance Municipal corporation 0.044 -0.027 0.076 0.003 
structure  [0.111] [0.051] [0.033]** [0.021] 
 Representative borough  -0.186  -0.094 
   [0.057]***  [0.022]*** 
 County  0.139  0.1  
  [0.122]  [0.033]***  
Franchise  Burgage franchise 0.004 -0.076 -0.043 0.007 
type  [0.115] [0.059] [0.033] [0.024] 
 Corporation franchise 0.235 0.115 0.033 0.047 
  [0.141]* [0.086] [0.048] [0.033] 
 Freeman franchise 0.131 -0.004 -0.025 -0.016 
  [0.083] [0.040] [0.022] [0.016] 
 Scot and lot franchise. -0.027 0.041 0.025 0.012 
  [0.099] [0.052] [0.029] [0.021] 
 Freehold franchise. 0.195 0.051 -0.013 -0.009 
  [0.229] [0.083] [0.051] [0.032] 
 Household franchise 0.196 0.042 0.025 -0.013 
  [0.354] [0.171] [0.095] [0.065] 
MPs’ 
occupations & Army career -0.294 0.069 0.015 0.02 
characteristics  [0.097]*** [0.052] [0.029] [0.021] 
 Financiers -0.079 0.065 0.042 0.02 
  [0.110] [0.054] [0.029] [0.023] 
 Dynasty heir -0.098 0.05 0.025 0.008 
  [0.075] [0.039] [0.022] [0.016] 
 Industrialist -0.114 -0.087 -0.065 -0.089 
  [0.103] [0.068] [0.039]* [0.028]*** 
 Jurist -0.139 0.051 0.027 0.011 
  [0.135] [0.052] [0.028] [0.020] 
 Merchant 0.00 -0.012 0.021 0.013 
  [0.106] [0.059] [0.034] [0.024] 
 Relatives in Parliament -0.016 -0.018 -0.029 -0.019 
  [0.066] [0.034] [0.018] [0.014] 
Political Uncontested seat (1800-1831) 0.055 0.007 0.044 0.018 
circumstances  [0.097] [0.047] [0.027] [0.019] 
 Seats after Reform  0.037 0.042 0.012 
   [0.037] [0.022]* [0.015] 
 Constant 0.838 0.853 0.788 0.95 
  [0.160]*** [0.101]*** [0.068]*** [0.041]*** 
      
 Continuing next page     
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 Party affiliation equation of the Whigs’ election in Parliament 
  22 March 1831 6 July 1831 20 September 1831 17 December 1831 
      
Patronage High influence -0.095 -0.96 -0.99 -0.954 
  [0.230] [0.260]*** [0.265]*** [0.269]*** 
 Some influence -0.086 -1.066 -1.098 -1.084 
  [0.206] [0.242]*** [0.247]*** [0.252]*** 
 No influence -0.136 -0.679 -0.704 -0.675 
  [0.252] [0.295]** [0.301]** [0.305]** 
 Treasury borough 0.093 -0.429 -0.496 -0.353 
  [0.328] [0.365] [0.370] [0.374] 
Governance Municipal corporation 9.056 14.928 15.258 13.207 
structure  [0.310]*** [0.336]*** [0.345]*** [0.360]*** 
 Representative borough 9.832 15.366 15.629 13.749 
  [0.337]*** [0.380]*** [0.388]*** [0.397]*** 
 County 9.877 16.224 16.43 14.605 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Franchise  Burgage franchise -0.134 -0.242 -0.311 -0.221 
type  [0.262] [0.281] [0.285] [0.295] 
 Corporation franchise -0.274 -0.655 -0.761 -0.618 
  [0.278] [0.280]** [0.288]*** [0.289]** 
 Freeman franchise 0.011 0.069 0.011 0.121 
  [0.192] [0.202] [0.206] [0.212] 
 Scot and lot franchise. 0.194 0.625 0.52 0.607 
  [0.241] [0.276]** [0.284]* [0.288]** 
 Freehold franchise -0.733 0.378 0.17 0.527 
  [0.421]* [0.451] [0.474] [0.462] 
 Household franchise 0.451 5.286 5.268 5.311 
  [0.917] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Economic  Thriving economy -0.116 -0.321 -0.407 -0.287 
circumstances  [0.193] [0.204] [0.211]* [0.212] 
 Declining economy 0.094 -0.223 -0.27 -0.454 
  [0.222] [0.227] [0.232] [0.256]* 
Occupational  Landowners employing workers -14.55 -0.494 2.163 -10.082 
structure  [8.864] [6.878] [7.037] [9.397] 
 Landowners not employing workers -0.66 -12.579 -15.462 -6.886 
  [7.069] [6.331]** [6.755]** [7.352] 
 Agricultural workers -0.258 3.823 4.244 3.942 
  [1.859] [1.887]** [1.938]** [1.994]** 
 Industry workers 0.186 3.815 4.327 3.121 
  [1.526] [1.538]** [1.581]*** [1.585]** 
 Other workers 0.78 2.538 2.954 1.974 
  [1.752] [1.775] [1.859] [1.812] 
 Artisans 0.144 4.473 4.817 3.722 
  [1.826] [1.825]** [1.887]** [1.888]** 
 Professionals 3.758 6.688 7.16 3.845 
  [4.549] [4.654] [4.769] [4.828] 
 Male servants above 20  2.315 5.379 7.204 3.299 
  [7.288] [7.856] [8.114] [8.537] 
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Political Contested seat 0.097 0.001 0.025 0.024 
circumstances  [0.187] [0.198] [0.203] [0.205] 
 Welsh borough 0.261 0.413 0.26 0.125 
  [0.366] [0.365] [0.394] [0.399] 
 Constant -9.675 -16.871 -17.438 -14.594 
  [1.411]*** [1.419]*** [1.466]*** [1.482]*** 
      
 Observations 392 391 376 364 
 Non-censored observations 238 146 146 146 
 λ -0.006 0.002 0.049 -0.005 
  [0.175] [0.096] [0.051] [0.035] 
 Wald (χ2) 1019.324 2303.569 2124.297 1653.304 
 Prob 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Notes: 
• Standard errors are given in brackets. 
• *** indicates significance at the 1%-level, ** indicates significance at the 5%-level, * indicates significance at the 
10%-level. 
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Table 5. Determinants of the Tories’ election and opposition to reform: all the constituencies excluding the disenfranchised boroughs. 
 
 Vote equation of the Tory support for Reform 
  22 March 1831 6 July 1831 20 September 1831 17 December 1831 
      
Patronage High influence 0.175 0.152 0.368 0.301 
  [0.111] [0.171] [0.153]** [0.169]* 
 Some influence 0.104 0.123 0.375 0.38 
  [0.104] [0.173] [0.153]** [0.171]** 
 No influence 0.009 -0.018 0.237 0.227 
  [0.127] [0.183] [0.170] [0.183] 
 Treasury borough 0.47 0.209 0.442 0.279 
  [0.160]*** [0.209] [0.193]** [0.219] 
Governance Municipal corporation -0.81 0.084 0.033 -0.148 
structure  [0.649] [0.389] [0.160] [0.464] 
 Representative borough -0.889 -0.181  -0.374 
  [0.692] [0.434]  [0.513] 
 University   0.245  
    [0.415]  
 County -0.947 -0.264 -0.147 -0.6 
  [0.634] [0.417] [0.188] [0.494] 
Franchise type Burgage franchise -0.098 -0.13 -0.013 -0.008 
  [0.127] [0.138] [0.136] [0.162] 
 Corporation franchise 0.071 -0.173 0.031 -0.011 
  [0.130] [0.136] [0.129] [0.147] 
 Freeman franchise 0.025 -0.157 0.041 0.038 
  [0.090] [0.109] [0.102] [0.121] 
 Scot and lot franchise. 0.161 -0.204 -0.053 -0.205 
  [0.122] [0.165] [0.151] [0.166] 
 Freehold franchise. 0.146 -0.728 -0.154 -0.65 
  [0.176] [0.369]** [0.349] [0.382]* 
 Household franchise -0.52    
  [0.482]    
MPs’ occupations Army career 0.008 -0.144 -0.134 0.022 
& characteristics  [0.095] [0.104] [0.103] [0.107] 
 Financiers 0.157 -0.477 -0.458 -0.569 
  [0.160] [0.174]*** [0.175]*** [0.209]*** 
 Dynasty heir -0.077 -0.016 0.058 0.177 
  [0.079] [0.103] [0.099] [0.106]* 
 Industrialist -0.16 -0.229 0.082 -0.352 
  [0.157] [0.199] [0.208] [0.255] 
 Jurist 0.014 0.06 0.016 0.166 
  [0.108] [0.112] [0.109] [0.116] 
 Merchant 0.087 0.24 0.171 0.073 
  [0.127] [0.161] [0.160] [0.207] 
 Relatives in Parliament 0.114 0.15 0.18 0.101 
  [0.075] [0.081]* [0.079]** [0.079] 
Political Uncontested seat  (1800-1831) 0.066 0.03 -0.082 0.007 
circumstances  [0.092] [0.100] [0.099] [0.103] 
 Seats after Reform  0.266 0.168 0.352 
   [0.130]** [0.125] [0.141]** 
 Constant 1.445 0.327 0.21 0.018 
  [0.596]** [0.407] [0.363] [0.483] 
 Continuing next page     
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 Party affiliation equation of the Tories’ election in Parliament 
  22 March 1831 6 July 1831 20 September 1831 17 December 1831 
      
Patronage High influence 0.151 1.05 0.915 0.848 
  [0.228] [0.270]*** [0.264]*** [0.286]*** 
 Some influence 0.118 1.155 1.021 1.046 
  [0.204] [0.252]*** [0.243]*** [0.263]*** 
 No influence 0.224 0.799 0.587 0.711 
  [0.250] [0.303]*** [0.301]* [0.320]** 
 Treasury borough -0.016 0.547 0.374 0.51 
  [0.329] [0.369] [0.371] [0.419] 
Governance Municipal corporation -8.778 -14.634 -15.354 -15.675 
structure  [0.306]*** [0.340]*** [0.291]*** [0.302]*** 
 Representative borough  -9.466 -15.125 -15.91 -16.175 
  [0.339]*** [0.384]*** [0.000] [0.000] 
 County -9.491 -15.995 -16.628 -16.999 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.398]*** [0.437]*** 
Franchise type Burgage franchise 0.132 0.315 0.35 0.517 
  [0.268] [0.284] [0.287] [0.311]* 
 Corporation franchise 0.272 0.672 0.629 0.866 
  [0.276] [0.287]** [0.289]** [0.306]*** 
 Freeman franchise 0.031 -0.041 -0.049 -0.022 
  [0.191] [0.202] [0.206] [0.227] 
 Scot and lot franchise. -0.14 -0.639 -0.565 -0.48 
  [0.242] [0.279]** [0.281]** [0.307] 
 Freehold franchise 0.712 -0.637 -0.521 -0.326 
  [0.431]* [0.496] [0.493] [0.510] 
 Household franchise -0.398 -5.292 -5.269 -5.246 
  [0.918] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Economic Thriving economy 0.11 0.422 0.425 0.577 
circumstances  [0.194] [0.206]** [0.207]** [0.221]*** 
 Declining economy -0.066 0.18 0.091 0.147 
  [0.227] [0.229] [0.239] [0.250] 
Occupational  Landowners employing workers 14.211 2.948 1.466 -0.218 
structure  [9.292] [6.942] [6.886] [7.621] 
 Landowners not employing workers -0.635 13.977 9.759 11.296 
  [7.262] [6.417]** [6.528] [7.323] 
 Agricultural workers 0.248 -3.807 -3.987 -1.721 
  [1.937] [1.916]** [1.951]** [2.716] 
 Industry workers -0.423 -3.803 -3.947 -2.007 
  [1.565] [1.560]** [1.559]** [2.367] 
 Other workers -0.334 -2.484 -2.916 -2.77 
  [1.848] [1.799] [1.811] [2.468] 
 Artisans -0.522 -4.532 -4.931 -2.922 
  [1.985] [1.859]** [1.867]*** [2.405] 
 Professionals -3.2 -6.048 -7.679 -5.891 
  [4.633] [4.745] [4.777] [5.158] 
 Male servants above 20  -3.213 -4.793 -5.086 -8.502 
  [7.646] [8.070] [8.218] [9.369] 
 Male servants below 20    19.134 
     [11.917] 
 Female servants    3.215 
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Political Contested seat -0.109 -0.04 -0.018 -0.069 
circumstances  [0.188] [0.200] [0.205] [0.220] 
 Welsh borough -0.246 -0.682 -0.374 -0.718 
  [0.372] [0.392]* [0.373] [0.422]* 
 Constant 9.322 16.375 17.559 15.847 
  [1.494]*** [1.452]*** [1.439]*** [2.239]*** 
      
 Observations 379 392 380 358 
 Non-censored observations 159 252 252 252 
 λ -0.256 -0.211 -0.206 -0.185 
  [0.241] [0.139] [0.137] [0.136] 
 Wald (χ2) 1097.295 2187.748 3563.83 3432.251 
 Prob 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Notes: 
• Standard errors are given in brackets. 
• *** indicates significance at the 1%-level, ** indicates significance at the 5%-level, * indicates significance at the 
10%-level. 
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Table A1. Descriptive statistics 
 
  Obs Mean Std Dv. Min Max 
Explanatory variables      
Governance structure Municipal corporation 511 0.618 0.486 0 1 
 Representative borough 511 0.192 0.394 0 1 
 University seat 511 0.004 0.062 0 1 
 County 511 0.186 0.389 0 1 
       
Franchise type Burgage franchise 511 0.137 0.344 0 1 
 Corporation franchise 511 0.108 0.310 0 1 
 Freeman franchise 511 0.327 0.470 0 1 
 Potwalloper franchise 511 0.051 0.220 0 1 
 Scot and lot franchise. 511 0.174 0.380 0 1 
 Freehold franchise. 511 0.027 0.163 0 1 
 County franchise 511 0.168 0.374 0 1 
 Household franchise 511 0.008 0.088 0 1 
MPs' occupations  Army career 513 0.191 0.393 0 1 
& attributes in 1830 Financiers 513 0.057 0.231 0 1 
 Dynasty heir 513 0.413 0.493 0 1 
 Industrialist 513 0.049 0.216 0 1 
 Jurist 513 0.129 0.335 0 1 
 Merchant 513 0.086 0.280 0 1 
 Landowner 513 0.454 0.498 0 1 
 Relatives in Parliament 505 0.624 0.485 0 1 
MPs' occupations Army career 513 0.185 0.389 0 1 
& attributes in 1831 Financiers 513 0.070 0.256 0 1 
 Dynasty heir 513 0.349 0.477 0 1 
 Industrialist 513 0.041 0.198 0 1 
 Jurist 513 0.148 0.356 0 1 
 Merchant 513 0.076 0.265 0 1 
 Landowner 513 0.380 0.486 0 1 
 Relatives in Parliament 506 0.625 0.485 0 1 
Economic circumstances Thriving economy 513 0.177 0.382 0 1 
 Declining economy 513 0.199 0.400 0 1 
Patronage High influence 511 0.333 0.472 0 1 
 Some influence 511 0.362 0.481 0 1 
 Low influence 511 0.151 0.358 0 1 
 No influence 511 0.100 0.300 0 1 
 Treasury borough 511 0.055 0.228 0 1 
Occupational structure Landowners employing workers 513 0.026 0.032 0 0.250 
 Landowners not employing workers 513 0.016 0.023 0 0.138 
 Agricultural workers 513 0.153 0.150 0 0.769 
 Industry workers 513 0.042 0.090 0 0.498 
 Other workers 513 0.324 0.113 0 0.872 
 Artisans 513 0.056 0.050 0 0.735 
 Professionals 513 0.136 0.085 0 0.589 
 Unknown professions 513 0.101 2.665 0 0.225 
 Male servants above 20  513 0.377 1.437 0 0.580 
 Male servants below 20 513 0.158 0.477 0 0.592 
 Female servants 513 0.281 0.785 0 0.554 
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Political circumstances Disenfranchised borough 513 0.220 0.415 0 1 
 English borough 513 0.953 0.211 0 1 
 Welsh borough 513 0.047 0.211 0 1 
 Contested seat 513 0.719 0.450 0 1 
 Uncontested seat (1800-1831) 513 0.224 0.417 0 1 
 Seats after Reform 513 1.990 0.388 1 4 
       
Dependent variables      
Whig support for the Reform on 17 December 1831 415 0.663 0.473 0 1 
Tory opposition to the Reform on 17 December 1831 415 0.340 0.474 0 1 
Whig support for the Reform on 20 September 1831 466 0.605 0.489 0 1 
Tory opposition to the Reform on 20 September 1831 466 0.391 0.488 0 1 
Whig support for the Reform on 6 July 1831 499 0.581 0.494 0 1 
Tory opposition to the Reform on 6 July 1831 499 0.381 0.486 0 1 
Whig support for the Reform on 17 December 1831 484 0.486 0.500 0 1 
Tory opposition to the Reform on 17 December 1831 483 0.480 0.500 0 1 
Share of Tories elected in the 1830 Parliament 513 0.627 0.484 0 1 
Share of Whigs elected in the 1830 Parliament 513 0.374 0.484 0 1 
Share of Tories elected in the 1831 Parliament 513 0.454 0.498 0 1 
Share of Whigs elected in the 1831 Parliament 513 0.546 0.498 0 1 
 
  
 55
Table A2. Determinants of the Whigs’ election and support for reform: all the constituencies. 
 
 Vote equation of the Whig support for Reform 
  22 March 1831 6 July 1831 20 September 1831 17 December 1831 
      
Patronage High influence -0.043 0.023 0.002 0.031 
  [0.103] [0.059] [0.033] [0.022] 
 Some influence -0.04 0.01 0.017 0.036 
  [0.086] [0.053] [0.029] [0.019]* 
 No influence 0.203 0.018 0.034 0.04 
  [0.110]* [0.056] [0.031] [0.020]** 
 Treasury borough -0.117 0.088 0.027 0.029 
  [0.133] [0.074] [0.041] [0.026] 
Governance Municipal corporation 0.04 -0.013 0.077 -0.007 
structure  [0.084] [0.048] [0.027]*** [0.018] 
 Representative borough  -0.125  -0.075 
   [0.060]**  [0.021]*** 
 County 0.153  0.093  
  [0.103]  [0.034]***  
Franchise Burgage franchise 0.081 -0.154 -0.023 0.001 
type  [0.106] [0.058]*** [0.032] [0.021] 
 Corporation franchise 0.308 0.045 -0.027 0.024 
  [0.133]** [0.075] [0.042] [0.027] 
 Freeman franchise 0.172 0.007 -0.016 -0.012 
  [0.082]** [0.042] [0.023] [0.015] 
 Scot and lot franchise. 0.015 0.044 0.026 0.015 
  [0.094] [0.050] [0.028] [0.018] 
 Freehold franchise. 0.265 0.042 -0.01 -0.006 
  [0.232] [0.089] [0.054] [0.031] 
 Household franchise 0.221 0.028 0.004 -0.004 
  [0.375] [0.181] [0.099] [0.062] 
MPs’ Army career -0.209 0.033 0.012 0.012 
occupations  [0.092]** [0.053] [0.030] [0.019] 
& attributes Financiers -0.167 0.029 0.041 0.019 
  [0.103] [0.056] [0.031] [0.021] 
 Dynasty heir -0.114 0.053 0.029 0.005 
  [0.074] [0.041] [0.023] [0.015] 
 Industrialist -0.095 -0.091 -0.068 -0.087 
  [0.101] [0.073] [0.042] [0.027]*** 
 Jurist -0.249 0.026 0 0.01 
  [0.117]** [0.051] [0.028] [0.018] 
 Merchant 0.028 -0.016 0.016 0.01 
  [0.105] [0.062] [0.037] [0.022] 
 Relatives in Parliament -0.04 0.011 -0.03 -0.012 
  [0.064] [0.034] [0.019] [0.013] 
Political Uncontested seat (1800-1831) 0.139 0.012 0.023 0.018 
circumstances  [0.086] [0.046] [0.027] [0.017] 
 Seats after Reform  0.027 0.037 0.012 
   [0.039] [0.024] [0.015] 
 Constant 0.912 0.876 0.811 0.947 
  [0.194]*** [0.107]*** [0.071]*** [0.039]*** 
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Party affiliation equation of the Whigs’ election in Parliament 
      
  22 March 1831 6 July 1831 20 September 1831 17 December 1831 
      
Patronage High influence -0.116 -0.791 -0.798 -0.818 
  [0.208] [0.229]*** [0.233]*** [0.237]*** 
 Some influence -0.079 -0.8 -0.801 -0.815 
  [0.192] [0.216]*** [0.219]*** [0.223]*** 
 No influence -0.06 -0.45 -0.457 -0.448 
  [0.242] [0.275] [0.279] [0.284] 
 Treasury borough 0.109 -0.558 -0.6 -0.48 
  [0.313] [0.340] [0.344]* [0.349] 
Governance Municipal corporation 8.778 11.72 11.755 9.922 
structure  [0.185]*** [0.198]*** [0.288]*** [0.291]*** 
 Representative borough 8.983 11.714 11.819 9.934 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.321]*** [0.321]*** 
 County 8.993 12.769 12.806 10.987 
  [0.270]*** [0.312]*** [0.000] [0.000] 
Franchise Burgage franchise 0.05 -0.007 -0.098 0.066 
type  [0.225] [0.240] [0.246] [0.249] 
 Corporation franchise -0.334 -0.512 -0.562 -0.51 
  [0.244] [0.251]** [0.258]** [0.258]** 
 Freeman franchise -0.028 0.107 0.109 0.174 
  [0.176] [0.186] [0.190] [0.193] 
 Scot and lot franchise. 0.347 0.332 0.262 0.32 
  [0.202]* [0.223] [0.230] [0.232] 
 Freehold franchise -0.638 0.437 0.2 0.6 
  [0.408] [0.443] [0.468] [0.455] 
 Household franchise 0.211 5.339 5.306 5.355 
  [0.912] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Economic Thriving economy -0.003 -0.398 -0.474 -0.337 
circumstances  [0.176] [0.185]** [0.192]** [0.191]* 
 Declining economy 0.19 -0.359 -0.385 -0.479 
  [0.168] [0.176]** [0.180]** [0.190]** 
Occupational Landowners employing workers -3.607 -4.115 -3.117 -6.585 
structure  [3.473] [4.068] [4.109] [4.821] 
 Landowners not employing workers -1.661 -10.57 -13.181 -8.079 
  [4.202] [4.910]** [5.300]** [5.198] 
 Agricultural workers 1.165 1.55 2.045 1.449 
  [1.336] [1.385] [1.422] [1.428] 
 Industry workers 0.178 1.16 1.685 0.74 
  [1.262] [1.275] [1.299] [1.307] 
 Other workers -0.57 1.438 2.11 1.051 
  [1.383] [1.353] [1.394] [1.383] 
 Artisans 1.062 1.678 2.081 1.281 
  [1.437] [1.459] [1.492] [1.508] 
 Professionals 5.304 0.937 1.271 -1.729 
  [3.579] [3.657] [3.749] [3.791] 
 Male servants above 20 -5.316 -3.625 -2.577 -5.366 
  [5.718] [6.019] [6.167] [6.554] 
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Political Disenfranchised borough -0.492 -0.751 -0.81 -0.664 
circumstances  [0.214]** [0.219]*** [0.226]*** [0.226]*** 
 Contested seat 0.035 -0.092 0.004 -0.048 
  [0.161] [0.168] [0.173] [0.172] 
 Welsh borough 0.055 0.016 -0.102 -0.321 
  [0.331] [0.335] [0.366] [0.367] 
 Constant -9.634 -11.581 -12.014 -9.487 
  [1.116]*** [1.138]*** [1.165]*** [1.175]*** 
      
 Observations 503 501 485 473 
 Non-censored observations 320 232 232 232 
 λ -0.114 -0.045 0.026 0.013 
  [0.184] [0.069] [0.037] [0.024] 
 Wald (χ2) 2576.079 3792.074 1880.414 1429.68 
 Prob 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Notes: 
• Standard errors are given in brackets. 
• *** indicates significance at the 1%-level, ** indicates significance at the 5%-level, * indicates significance at the 
10%-level. 
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 Table A3. Determinants of the Whigs’ election and opposition to reform: the disenfranchised boroughs. 
 
Vote equation of the Whig support for Reform 
  22 March 1831 6 July 1831 20 September 1831 
     
Patronage High influence 0.161  -0.169 
  [0.182]  [0.155] 
 Some influence -0.063 -0.18  
  [0.161] [0.280]  
 No influence 0.168   
  [0.288]   
 Treasury borough 0.442   
  [0.399]   
Governance  Municipal corporation 0.638 0.275  
structure  [0.270]** [0.187]  
 Representative borough  0.247  -0.365 
  [0.314]  [0.113]*** 
 University 0.26   
  [0.173]   
Franchise type Burgage franchise  -0.771 0.478 
   [0.575] [0.127]*** 
 Corporation franchise  -0.97  
   [0.566]*  
 Freeman franchise  -0.34 0.546 
   [0.545] [0.125]*** 
 Scot and lot franchise.  -0.339 0.654 
   [0.615] [0.151]*** 
MPs’ occupations Army career 0.397 -0.488 -0.123 
& characteristics  [0.346] [0.264]* [0.127] 
 Financiers -0.468 -0.44 -0.084 
  [0.256]* [0.279] [0.213] 
 Dynasty heir -0.174 0.2 0.15 
  [0.309] [0.260] [0.097] 
 Industrialist -0.386   
  [0.596]   
 Jurist -0.409 -0.148 -0.15 
  [0.234]* [0.229] [0.095] 
 Merchant 0.303   
  [0.374]   
 Relatives in Parliament -0.174 0.206 0.043 
  [0.316] [0.188] [0.083] 
Political Uncontested seat (1800-1831)  -0.011 0.28 
circumstances   [0.322] [0.167]* 
 Constant 0.543 1.392 0.804 
  [0.455] [0.917] [0.169]*** 
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Party affiliation equation of the Whigs’ election in Parliament 
  22 March 1831 6 July 1831 20 September 1831 
     
Patronage High influence 7.898 5.491 5.799 
  [0.344]*** [0.373]*** [0.403]*** 
 Some influence 7.87 5.785 5.998 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
 Treasury borough 3.457 0.462 0.094 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Governance  Municipal corporation 0.144  -0.081 
structure  [0.361]  [0.379] 
 Representative borough  -0.287  
   [0.367]  
Franchise type Burgage franchise 0.215 1.175 6.78 
  [0.587] [0.734] [0.000] 
 Corporation franchise -0.456 0.204 6.009 
  [0.707] [0.804] [0.640]*** 
 Freeman franchise -0.307 0.423 6.359 
  [0.531] [0.699] [0.490]*** 
 Scot and lot franchise. 0.265 0.817 6.414 
  [0.519] [0.699] [0.503]*** 
Economic  Thriving economy -8.688 -7.6 -7.336 
circumstances  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
 Declining economy 0.385 -0.439 -0.242 
  [0.343] [0.371] [0.387] 
Occupational  Landowners employing workers -3.291 -11.445 -10.315 
structure  [4.577] [6.690]* [6.892] 
 Landowners not employing workers 5.846 -0.871 -1.851 
  [7.291] [8.223] [9.167] 
 Agricultural workers 4.262 -1.66 -0.214 
  [2.620] [2.778] [2.755] 
 Industry workers 8.563 0.749 2.526 
  [9.931] [10.686] [12.134] 
 Other workers -1.018 0.017 2.355 
  [2.928] [2.819] [2.869] 
 Artisans 4.758 -1.679 -0.21 
  [2.949] [3.068] [3.056] 
 Professionals 7.479 -10.447 -11.957 
  [8.933] [9.289] [9.494] 
 Male servants above 20  -27.193 -20.463 -17.457 
  [14.065]* [15.254] [16.498] 
Political Contested seat -0.051 -0.752 -0.163 
circumstances  [0.398] [0.427]* [0.441] 
 Constant -11.025 -4.024 -11.652 
  [2.342]*** [2.589] [2.428]*** 
     
 Observations 111 110 109 
 Non-censored observations 82 86 86 
 λ -0.042 -0.153 -0.188 
  [0.157] [0.204] [0.129] 
 Wald (χ2) 615.792 35.367 465.797 
 Prob 0.000 0.004 0.000 
Notes: We do not present results for the Whig vote on 17 December 1831 because we were unable to find a specification which did 
not entail a specification bias. Standard errors are given in brackets. *** indicates significance at the 1%-level, ** indicates 
significance at the 5%-level, * indicates significance at the 10%-level. 
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Table A4. Determinants of the Tories’ election and opposition to reform: all the constituencies. 
 Vote equation of the Tory support for Reform 
  22 March 1831 6 July 1831 20 September 1831 17 December 1831 
      
Patronage High influence 0.192 0.264 0.43 0.45 
  [0.099]* [0.110]** [0.094]*** [0.100]*** 
 Some influence 0.113 0.23 0.445 0.462 
  [0.093] [0.113]** [0.095]*** [0.101]*** 
 No influence -0.009 0.025 0.222 0.215 
  [0.119] [0.145] [0.132]* [0.140] 
 Treasury borough 0.366 0.3 0.433 0.364 
  [0.147]** [0.156]* [0.137]*** [0.160]** 
Governance Municipal corporation -0.811 -0.001 0.337 0.572 
structure  [0.622] [0.348] [0.103]*** [0.120]*** 
 Representative borough -0.821 -0.024 0.367 0.603 
  [0.620] [0.347] [0.112]*** [0.129]*** 
 University   0.573 0.793 
    [0.302]* [0.397]** 
 County -0.956 -0.482   
  [0.610] [0.340]   
Franchise  Burgage franchise -0.08 -0.166 -0.017 -0.075 
type  [0.105] [0.092]* [0.083] [0.094] 
 Corporation franchise 0.078 -0.061 0.057 0.017 
  [0.112] [0.091] [0.084] [0.091] 
 Freeman franchise -0.018 -0.127 -0.006 0.001 
  [0.082] [0.078] [0.070] [0.083] 
 Scot and lot franchise. 0.17 -0.177 -0.119 -0.164 
  [0.102]* [0.092]* [0.084] [0.094]* 
 Freehold franchise. 0.097 -0.621 -0.15 -0.403 
  [0.169] [0.308]** [0.278] [0.310] 
 Household franchise -0.562    
  [0.468]    
MPs’ occupations Army career 0.052 -0.091 -0.057 -0.012 
& characteristics  [0.081] [0.077] [0.071] [0.077] 
 Financiers 0.114 -0.242 -0.223 -0.224 
  [0.138] [0.117]** [0.108]** [0.121]* 
 Dynasty heir -0.063 0.02 0.085 0.131 
  [0.070] [0.076] [0.068] [0.075]* 
 Industrialist -0.161 -0.127 0.069 -0.268 
  [0.148] [0.140] [0.134] [0.189] 
 Jurist -0.015 0.074 0.007 0.057 
  [0.086] [0.082] [0.074] [0.082] 
 Merchant 0.079 0.174 0.104 0.143 
  [0.100] [0.105]* [0.099] [0.120] 
 Relatives in Parliament 0.06 0.103 0.077 0.063 
  [0.062] [0.057]* [0.052] [0.057] 
Political Uncontested seat (1800-1831) 0.02 0.053 -0.069 0 
circumstances  [0.072] [0.063] [0.059] [0.066] 
 Seats after Reform  0.176 0.091 0.213 
   [0.104]* [0.097] [0.116]* 
 Constant 1.534 0.543 0.134 -0.408 
  [0.585]*** [0.355] [0.238] [0.314] 
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 Party affiliation equation of the Tories’ election in Parliament 
  22 March 1831 6 July 1831 20 September 1831 17 December 1831 
      
Occupational Landowners employing workers 4.683 3.155 2.953 2.561 
structure  [3.710] [3.501] [3.568] [4.074] 
 Landowners not employing workers 3.478 2.687 1.162 -3.047 
  [3.942] [3.758] [3.832] [4.381] 
 Agricultural workers 1.177 -0.46 -1.109 -1.687 
  [1.665] [1.547] [1.548] [1.627] 
 Industry workers 1.44 -1.365 -1.854 -2.318 
  [1.648] [1.556] [1.553] [1.618] 
 Other workers 2.198 -1.447 -2.054 -3.369 
  [1.736] [1.598] [1.600] [1.726]* 
 Artisans 0.368 -1.182 -1.882 -2.196 
  [1.710] [1.578] [1.582] [1.646] 
 Professionals 1.21 2.613 2.226 1.425 
  [2.212] [2.745] [2.748] [3.228] 
 Male servants above 20  9.707 -0.383 -2.683 -0.066 
  [6.094] [5.860] [5.989] [6.275] 
 Male servants below 20 -11.027 3.88 7.606 8.886 
  [8.545] [8.122] [8.321] [8.666] 
 Female servants 1.879 -0.056 -0.922 -1.684 
  [2.304] [2.225] [2.241] [2.357] 
 Constant -1.023 0.269 0.848 1.279 
  [1.514] [1.403] [1.403] [1.462] 
      
 Observations 480 501 485 445 
 Non-censored observations 191 280 280 280 
 λ -0.193 -0.25 -0.217 -0.177 
  [0.242] [0.168] [0.149] [0.154] 
 Wald (χ2) 37.697 63.998 63.483 83.274 
 Prob 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
 
Notes: 
• Standard errors are given in brackets. 
• *** indicates significance at the 1%-level, ** indicates significance at the 5%-level, * indicates significance at the 
10%-level. 
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Table A5. Determinants of the Tories’ election and opposition to reform: the disenfranchised boroughs. 
 
 Vote equation of the Tory support for Reform 
  22 March 1831 6 July 1831 20 September 1831 17 December 1831 
      
Patronage High influence 0.276 0.322 0.369 0.527 
  [0.230] [0.132]** [0.090]*** [0.076]*** 
 Some influence 0.182 0.349 0.374 0.595 
  [0.250] [0.139]** [0.094]*** [0.081]*** 
 Treasury borough -0.19 0.5 0.409 0.565 
  [0.343] [0.196]** [0.136]*** [0.150]*** 
Governance Municipal corporation 0.084 0.002   
structure  [0.113] [0.059]   
 Representative borough    -0.077 -0.012 
    [0.040]* [0.042] 
Franchise type Burgage franchise -0.042 -0.097 0.025 0.052 
  [0.160] [0.086] [0.059] [0.061] 
 Corporation franchise 0.125 -0.024 0.014 -0.049 
  [0.186] [0.089] [0.064] [0.066] 
 Freeman franchise -0.197 -0.072 -0.069 -0.009 
  [0.173] [0.085] [0.057] [0.059] 
 Scot and lot franchise. 0.066 -0.092 -0.048 -0.093 
  [0.162] [0.080] [0.057] [0.053]* 
MPs’ occupations Army career 0.128 0.014 0.112 0.01 
& characteristics  [0.158] [0.083] [0.057]* [0.061] 
 Financiers 0.179 0.084 0.089 0.009 
  [0.280] [0.114] [0.078] [0.072] 
 Dynasty heir 0.07 0.043 0.131 0.038 
  [0.144] [0.077] [0.050]*** [0.048] 
 Industrialist  -0.013 -0.047 -0.012 
   [0.139] [0.099] [0.133] 
 Jurist -0.053 0.12 0.063 0.004 
  [0.138] [0.087] [0.058] [0.055] 
 Merchant 0.145 0.133 0.145 0.056 
  [0.157] [0.102] [0.073]** [0.068] 
 Relatives in Parliament -0.189 0.093 -0.017 0.036 
  [0.099]* [0.053]* [0.037] [0.037] 
Political Uncontested seat  (1800-1831) -0.099 0.102 0.001 0.079 
circumstances  [0.096] [0.058]* [0.041] [0.049] 
 Constant 0.79 0.563 0.604 0.445 
  [0.307]** [0.164]*** [0.112]*** [0.098]*** 
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 Party affiliation equation of the Tories’ election in Parliament 
  22 March 1831 6 July 1831 20 September 1831 17 December 1831 
      
Patronage High influence -9.562 -6.884 -9.7 -9.047 
  [0.365]*** [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
 Some influence -9.572 -7.22 -9.977 -9.367 
  [0.000] [0.360]*** [0.370]*** [0.398]*** 
 Treasury borough -5.162 -1.318 -4.016 -3.323 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Governance Municipal corporation -0.261 -0.122 -0.103  
structure  [0.380] [0.358] [0.371]  
 Representative borough     0.247 
     [0.410] 
Franchise type Burgage franchise -0.266 -1.023 -1.282 -1.345 
  [0.613] [0.653] [0.713]* [0.780]* 
 Corporation franchise 0.543 -0.014 -0.143 0.002 
  [0.730] [0.728] [0.773] [0.831] 
 Freeman franchise 0.228 -0.393 -0.594 -0.841 
  [0.553] [0.615] [0.672] [0.745] 
 Scot and lot franchise. -0.453 -0.48 -1.01 -0.897 
  [0.561] [0.611] [0.716] [0.789] 
Economic Thriving economy 10.744 9.857 13.803 4.708 
circumstances  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
 Declining economy -0.395 0.278 0.182 0.503 
  [0.351] [0.354] [0.359] [0.397] 
Occupational Landowners employing workers 2.663 8.39 9.976 8.187 
structure  [5.360] [6.406] [7.155] [8.872] 
 Landowners not employing workers -0.661 0.802 -0.881 0.333 
  [7.517] [8.165] [8.460] [9.836] 
 Agricultural workers -2.85 0.267 0.313 -0.103 
  [2.593] [2.631] [2.698] [2.683] 
 Industry workers -12.309 -7.513 -16.163 -15.275 
  [10.971] [9.168] [10.697] [11.466] 
 Other workers 2.945 -1.929 -1.834 -1.93 
  [2.888] [2.662] [2.685] [2.766] 
 Artisans -2.847 -0.268 -0.498 -1.426 
  [2.825] [2.847] [2.910] [3.020] 
 Professionals -6.611 9.872 8.983 7.092 
  [9.387] [9.005] [9.144] [9.884] 
 Male servants above 20  28.928 18.122 15.416 29.586 
  [14.592]** [14.797] [14.682] [18.866] 
Political Contested seat 0.171 0.612 0.833 1.101 
circumstances  [0.425] [0.397] [0.451]* [0.493]** 
 Constant 11.352 6.905 9.976 8.997 
  [2.317]*** [2.420]*** [2.500]*** [2.505]*** 
      
 Observations 100 108 104 86 
 Non-censored observations 31 27 27 27 
 λ -0.182 -0.055 -0.02 -0.079 
  [0.162] [0.094] [0.061] [0.054] 
 Wald (χ2) 773.999 460.661 778.452 693.62 
 Prob 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Notes:• Standard errors are given in brackets.• *** indicates significance at the 1%-level, ** indicates significance at the 5%-level, * 
indicates significance at the 10%-level. 
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Figure 1 The occupations of the English and Welsh MPs in the 1830 and 1831 Parliaments. 
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Notes: The different categories are not mutually exclusive and a particular MP can therefore be recorded in 
more than one category (e.g., army career and landowner).  
Sources: Judd (1955), Namier and Brooke (1964), Porrit and Porrit (1903), Stookes Smith (1973), Thorne 
(1986), and various editions of Dod’s Parliamentary companion. 
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Figure 2 Number of contested elections between 1802 and 1831 in the English Boroughs. 
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Notes:  
The histogram includes Grampound and East Retford which were disenfranchised and had their seats 
transferred to Yorkshire in 1821 and Bassetlaw in 1826, respectively. 
Source: Cannon (1973, Appendix 3). 
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Figure 3: Overview of the estimation approach 
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